相关论文: Single-Leader-Multiple-Followers Stackelberg Secur…

This paper investigates strategic interactions within a three party deception security game involving a defender, an insider, and external attackers. We propose a robust deception mechanism where the leader manipulates game parameters…

Many real-world strategic games involve interactions between multiple players. We study a hierarchical multi-player game structure, where players with asymmetric roles can be separated into leaders and followers, a setting often referred to…

There has been significant recent interest in leader-follower security games, where the leader dominates the decision process with the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) strategy. However, such a leader-follower scheme may become invalid in…

We investigate the equilibrium stability and robustness in a class of moving target defense problems, in which players have both incomplete information and asymmetric cognition. We first establish a Bayesian Stackelberg game model for…

This paper proposes and studies a class of discrete-time finite-time-horizon Stackelberg mean-field games, with one leader and an infinite number of identical and indistinguishable followers. In this game, the objective of the leader is to…

The concept of leader--follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real--world applications of game theory. While the case with a single follower has been thoroughly investigated, results with multiple…

The multi-leader--multi-follower game (MLMFG) involves two or more leaders and followers and serves as a generalization of the Stackelberg game and the single-leader--multi-follower game (SLMFG). Although MLMFG covers wide range of…

We study the control of rumor propagation in large networked populations by using Stackelberg graphon games. We first introduce a principal who wants to incentivize the spread of her preferred news and discourage the spread of non-preferred…

There has been significant recent interest in game-theoretic approaches to security, with much of the recent research focused on utilizing the leader-follower Stackelberg game model. Among the major applications are the ARMOR program…

In this paper, we consider a discrete-time Stackelberg mean field game with a leader and an infinite number of followers. The leader and the followers each observe types privately that evolve as conditionally independent controlled Markov…

Information uncertainty is one of the major challenges facing applications of game theory. In the context of Stackelberg games, various approaches have been proposed to deal with the leader's incomplete knowledge about the follower's…

We introduce the framework of LLM-Stackelberg games, a class of sequential decision-making models that integrate large language models (LLMs) into strategic interactions between a leader and a follower. Departing from classical Stackelberg…

We study multi-player general-sum Markov games with one of the players designated as the leader and the other players regarded as followers. In particular, we focus on the class of games where the followers are myopic, i.e., they aim to…

In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…

Interactions among selfish users sharing a common transmission channel can be modeled as a non-cooperative game using the game theory framework. When selfish users choose their transmission probabilities independently without any…

This paper is concerned with a three-level multi-leader-follower incentive Stackelberg game with $H_\infty$ constraint. Based on $H_2/H_\infty$ control theory, we firstly obtain the worst-case disturbance and the team-optimal strategy by…

Adversarial decision-making in partially observable multi-agent systems requires sophisticated strategies for both deception and counter-deception. This paper presents a sequential hypothesis testing (SHT)-driven framework that captures the…

We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player meanpayoff games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution concepts such as Nash equilibria and leader equilibria (also known as Stackelberg equilibria). Recall that…

In this paper, we consider a discrete-time Stackelberg mean field game with a finite number of leaders, a finite number of major followers and an infinite number of minor followers. The leaders and the followers each observe types privately…

This paper is concerned with an overlapping information linear-quadratic (LQ) Stackelberg stochastic differential game with two leaders and two followers, where the diffusion terms of the state equation contain both the control and state…