相关论文: Dynamic Games of Social Distancing during an Epide…
In this paper, we present a game-theoretic model describing voluntary social distancing during the spread of an epidemic. The payoffs of the agents depend on the social distancing they practice and on the probability of getting infected. We…
The mathematical characterization of social-distancing games in classical epidemic theory remains an important question, for their applications to both infectious-disease theory and memetic theory. We consider a special case of the dynamic…
We investigate an SIR model of epidemic propagation on networks in the context of mean-field games. In a real epidemic, individuals adjust their behavior depending on the epidemic level and the impact it might have on them in the future.…
We propose a model, which nests a susceptible-infected-recovered-deceased (SIRD) epidemic model into a dynamic macroeconomic equilibrium framework with agents' mobility. The latter affect both their income and their probability of infecting…
The spontaneous behavioral changes of the agents during an epidemic can have significant effects on the delay and the prevalence of its spread. In this work, we study a social distancing game among the agents of a population, who determine…
During pandemic events, strategies such as social distancing can be fundamental to curb viral spreading. Such actions can reduce the number of simultaneous infections and mitigate the disease spreading, which is relevant to the risk of a…
Social distancing as one of the main non-pharmaceutical interventions can help slow down the spread of diseases, like in the COVID-19 pandemic. Effective social distancing, unless enforced as drastic lockdowns and mandatory cordon…
Faced with a dangerous epidemic humans will spontaneously social distance to reduce their risk of infection at a socio-economic cost. Compartmentalised epidemic models have been extended to include this endogenous decision making:…
In this paper, we develop a mean-field game model for SEIR epidemics on heterogeneous contact networks, where individuals choose state-dependent contact effort to balance infection losses against the social and economic costs of isolation.…
Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…
The design of coherent and efficient policies to address infectious diseases and their consequences requires to model not only epidemics dynamics, but also individual behaviors, as the latter has a strong influence on the former. In our…
Numerous elements drive the spread of infectious diseases in complex real-world networks. Of particular interest is social behaviors that evolve in tandem with the spread of disease. Moreover, recent studies highlight the importance of…
This paper develops a Nash-equilibrium extension of the classic SIR model of infectious-disease epidemiology ("Nash SIR"), endogenizing people's decisions whether to engage in economic activity during a viral epidemic and allowing for…
In this paper, we show how a dynamic population game can model the strategic interaction and migration decisions made by a large population of agents in response to epidemic prevalence. Specifically, we consider a modified…
We consider the spread of infectious diseases through a Mean Field Game version of a SIR compartmental model with social structure, in which individuals are grouped by their age class and interact together in different settings. In our game…
COVID-19 is a global epidemic. Till now, there is no remedy for this epidemic. However, isolation and social distancing are seemed to be effective preventive measures to control this pandemic. Therefore, in this paper, an optimization…
Given the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, it is of interest to understand how the infections spread as the combined result of measures taken by central planners (governments) and individual behavior. In this work, the spread of Covid-19 is…
We investigate the evolution of epidemics over dynamical networks when nodes choose to interact with others in a selfish and decentralized manner. Specifically, we analyze the susceptible-asymptomatic-infected-recovered (SAIR) epidemic in…
This paper addresses a class of network games played by dynamic agents using their outputs. Unlike most existing related works, the Nash equilibrium in this work is defined by functions of agent outputs instead of full agent states, which…
We propose a competitive bi-virus model with dynamic social distancing behavior. Our model illustrates how public perception of different viruses changes the conditions for their eradication, their coexistence, or the dominance of one over…