相关论文: A Fragile multi-CPR Game

We study the complexity of computing equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs. In such a game, players correspond to vertices in a graph and face a binary choice of performing an action, or not. Each player's decision…

Facility location games have been a topic of major interest in economics, operations research and computer science, starting from the seminal work by Hotelling. Spatial facility location models have successfully predicted the outcome of…

Humanity faces numerous problems of common-pool resource appropriation. This class of multi-agent social dilemma includes the problems of ensuring sustainable use of fresh water, common fisheries, grazing pastures, and irrigation systems.…

The problem of efficient sharing of a resource is nearly ubiquitous. Except for pure public goods, each agent's use creates a negative externality; often the negative externality is so strong that efficient sharing is impossible in the…

Fictitious play (FP) is one of the most fundamental game-theoretical learning frameworks for computing Nash equilibrium in $n$-player games, which builds the foundation for modern multi-agent learning algorithms. Although FP has provable…

A robust game is a distribution-free model to handle ambiguity generated by a bounded set of possible realizations of the values of players' payoff functions. The players are worst-case optimizers and a solution, called robust-optimization…

In Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network systems, content (object) delivery between nodes is often required. One way to study such a distributed system is by defining games, which involve selfish nodes that make strategic choices on replicating…

The preferences of players in non-cooperative games represent their choice in the set of available options, which meet the completeness property if players are able to compare any pair of available options. In the existing literature, the…

We address the problem of assessing the robustness of the equilibria in uncertain, multi-agent games. Specifically, we focus on generalized Nash equilibrium problems in aggregative form subject to linear coupling constraints affected by…

In resource buying games a set of players jointly buys a subset of a finite resource set E (e.g., machines, edges, or nodes in a digraph). The cost of a resource e depends on the number (or load) of players using e, and has to be paid…

People, robots, and companies mostly divide time and effort among projects, and \defined{shared effort games} model people investing resources in public endeavors and sharing the generated values. In linear $\theta$ sharing (effort) games,…

In this paper, an aggregate game approach is proposed for the modeling and analysis of energy consumption control in smart grid. Since the electricity user's cost function depends on the aggregate load, which is unknown to the end users, an…

The mean field limit of large-population symmetric stochastic differential games is derived in a general setting, with and without common noise, on a finite time horizon. Minimal assumptions are imposed on equilibrium strategies, which may…

Interactions among selfish users sharing a common transmission channel can be modeled as a non-cooperative game using the game theory framework. When selfish users choose their transmission probabilities independently without any…

We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…

This paper discusses a special type of multi-user communication scenario, in which users' utilities are linearly impacted by their competitors' actions. First, we explicitly characterize the Nash equilibrium and Pareto boundary of the…

Fictitious play (FP) is a history-based strategy to choose actions in normal-form games, where players best-respond to the empirical frequency of their opponents' past actions. While it is well-established that FP converges to the set of…

We consider the problem of designing distribution rules to share "welfare" (cost or revenue) among individually strategic agents. There are many known distribution rules that guarantee the existence of a (pure) Nash equilibrium in this…

To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…

In the presence of a common noise, we study the convergence problems in mean field game (MFG) and mean field control (MFC) problem where the cost function and the state dynamics depend upon the joint conditional distribution of the…