相关论文: Incentive Design and Profit Sharing in Multi-modal…
Recently, some transportation service providers attempt to integrate the ride services offered by multiple independent ride-sourcing platforms, and passengers are able to request ride through such third-party integrators or connectors and…
In this paper, we study a routing and travel-mode choice problem for mobility systems with a multimodal transportation network as a ``mobility game" with coupled action sets. We develop a game-theoretic framework to study the impact on…
The design of integrated mobility-on-demand services requires jointly considering the interactions between traveler choice behavior and operators' operation policies to design a financially sustainable pricing scheme. However, most existing…
Transit agencies have the opportunity to outsource certain services to established Mobility-on-Demand (MOD) providers. Such alliances can improve service quality, coverage, and ridership; reduce public sector costs and vehicular emissions;…
Informal and privatized transit services, such as minibuses and shared auto-rickshaws, are integral to daily travel in large urban metropolises, providing affordable commutes where a formal public transport system is inadequate and other…
The evolution of existing transportation systems,mainly driven by urbanization and increased availability of mobility options, such as private, profit-maximizing ride-hailing companies, calls for tools to reason about their design and…
Profit-sharing is needed within platoons in order for competing transportation companies to collaborate in forming platoons. In this paper, we propose distribution models of the profit designed for vehicles that are located at the same…
We consider a profit maximization problem in an urban mobility on-demand service, of which the operator owns a fleet, provides both exclusive and shared trip services, and dynamically determines prices of offers. With knowledge of the…
Many real-world systems such as taxi systems, traffic networks and smart grids involve self-interested actors that perform individual tasks in a shared environment. However, in such systems, the self-interested behaviour of agents produces…
We consider ride-sharing networks served byhuman-driven vehicles and autonomous vehicles. First, wepropose a novel model for ride-sharing in this mixed autonomysetting for a multi-location network in which the platformsets prices for…
The evolution of existing transportation systems, mainly driven by urbanization and increased availability of mobility options, such as private, profit-maximizing ride-hailing companies, calls for tools to reason about their design and…
The performance of multimodal mobility systems relies on the seamless integration of conventional mass transit services and the advent of Mobility-on-Demand (MoD) services. Prior work is limited to individually improving various transport…
In a ride-pooling system, travellers experience discomfort associated with a detour and a longer travel time, which is compensated with a sharing discount. Most studies assume travellers receive either a flat discount or, in rare cases, a…
We consider ride-sharing networks served by human-driven vehicles (HVs) and autonomous vehicles (AVs). We propose a model for ride-sharing in this mixed autonomy setting for a multi-location network in which a ride-sharing platform sets…
We analyse a non-cooperative game between two competing ride-hailing platforms, each of which is modeled as a two-sided queueing system, where drivers (with a limited level of patience) are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process…
This paper investigates the impacts of competition in autonomous mobility-on-demand systems. By adopting a network-flow based formulation, we first determine the optimal strategies of profit-maximizing platform operators in monopoly and…
We study a pricing game in multi-hop relay networks where nodes price their services and route their traffic selfishly and strategically. In this game, each node (1) announces pricing functions which specify the payments it demands from its…
Ride-hailing platforms (e.g., Uber, Lyft) have transformed urban mobility by enabling ride-sharing, which holds considerable promise for reducing both travel costs and total vehicle miles traveled (VMT). However, the fragmentation of these…
We propose a generalized market equilibrium model using assignment game criteria for evaluating transportation systems that consist of both operators' and users' decisions. The model finds stable pricing, in terms of generalized costs, and…
We analyse a non-cooperative strategic game among two ride-hailing platforms, each of which is modeled as a two-sided queueing system, where drivers (with a certain patience level) are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process at a…