相关论文: Optimal Collaterals in Multi-Enterprise Investment…

Network games provide a framework to study strategic decision making processes that are governed by structured interdependencies among agents. However, existing models do not account for environments in which agents simultaneously interact…

The aim of this paper is to quantify and manage systemic risk caused by default contagion in the interbank market. We model the market as a random directed network, where the vertices represent financial institutions and the weighted edges…

We study the problem of optimally investing in nodes of a social network in a competitive setting, wherein two camps aim to drive the average opinion of the population in their own favor. Using a well-established model of opinion dynamics,…

Rapid growth of large loads led by data centers is straining grid capacity. These loads increasingly accept curtailment risk through non-firm interconnection agreements to gain faster grid access, expanding the pool of consumers subject to…

This paper studies optimal contract design in private market investing, focusing on internal decision making in venture capital and private equity firms. A principal relies on an agent who privately exerts costly due diligence effort and…

We consider networks of banks with assets and liabilities. Some banks may be insolvent, and a central bank can decide which insolvent banks, if any, to bail out. We view bailouts as an optimization problem where the central bank has given…

Counterparty risk denotes the risk that a party defaults in a bilateral contract. This risk not only depends on the two parties involved, but also on the risk from various other contracts each of these parties holds. In rather informal…

When multiple users share a common link in direct transmission, packet loss and network collision may occur due to the simultaneous arrival of traffics at the source node. To tackle this problem, users may resort to an indirect path: the…

Evaluation of systemic risk in networks of financial institutions in general requires information of inter-institution financial exposures. In the framework of Debt Rank algorithm, we introduce an approximate method of systemic risk…

I study a moral hazard problem between a principal and multiple agents who experience positive peer effects represented by a (weighted) network. Under the optimal linear contract, the principal provides high-powered incentives to central…

In portfolio compression, market participants (banks, organizations, companies, financial agents) sign contracts, creating liabilities between each other, which increases the systemic risk. Large, dense markets commonly can be compressed by…

In this paper we consider reinsurance or risk sharing from a macroeconomic point of view. Our aim is to find socially optimal reinsurance treaties. In our setting we assume that there are $n$ insurance companies each bearing a certain risk…

Financial markets such as bond, derivatives, and repo markets form networks of interdependent obligations. Existing multilateral netting methods typically trade off the extent of netting against preservation of counterparty exposure:…

We deal with the problem of outsourcing the debt for a big investment, according two situations: either the firm outsources both the investment (and the associated debt) and the exploitation to a private consortium, or the firm supports the…

This paper develops a dynamic insurance market model comprising two competing insurance companies and a continuum of insureds, and examines the interaction between strategic underreporting by the insureds and competitive pricing between the…

In [1] Zawadoski introduces a banking network model in which the asset and counter-party risks are treated separately and the banks hedge their assets risks by appropriate OTC contracts. In his model, each bank has only two counter-party…

We consider a class of interdependent security games on networks where each node chooses a personal level of security investment. The attack probability experienced by a node is a function of her own investment and the investment by her…

We study the problem of designing dynamic intervention policies for minimizing networked defaults in financial networks. Formally, we consider a dynamic version of the celebrated Eisenberg-Noe model of financial network liabilities and use…

We consider the scenario where $N$ utilities strategically bid for electricity in the day-ahead market and balance the mismatch between the committed supply and actual demand in the real-time market, with uncertainty in demand and local…

We explore stability and fairness considerations in decentralized networked markets with bilateral contracts, building on the trading networks framework [Hatfield et al., 2013]. In our trading network game, we show that a well-defined…