Decentralized Trading Networks: Equilibria and Fairness
Abstract
We explore stability and fairness considerations in decentralized networked markets with bilateral contracts, building on the trading networks framework [Hatfield et al., 2013]. In our trading network game, we show that a well-defined subset of Nash equilibria can be supported as competitive equilibria. Considering an offer-based trading dynamic as well as a stochastic price clock market, we prove new convergence results to Nash equilibrium and competitive equilibrium, providing a rationale for stability properties in decentralized, dynamic trading networks. Turning to the tension between fairness and (core) stability, we prove several negative results: inessential agents always receive zero utility in any core outcome, and even essential agents can get zero utility in all core outcomes.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2602.20868,
title = {Decentralized Trading Networks: Equilibria and Fairness},
author = {Simon Finster and Paul W. Goldberg and Edwin Lock and Matilde Tullii},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2602.20868},
year = {2026}
}