相关论文: Walrasian Equilibria in Markets with Small Demands

We present the first polynomial time algorithm for computing Walrasian equilibrium in an economy with indivisible goods and \emph{general} buyer valuations having only access to an \emph{aggregate demand oracle}, i.e., an oracle that given…

Central results in economics guarantee the existence of efficient equilibria for various classes of markets. An underlying assumption in early work is that agents are price-takers, i.e., agents honestly report their true demand in response…

A classical trading experiment consists of a set of unit demand buyers and unit supply sellers with identical items. Each agent's value or opportunity cost for the item is their private information and preferences are quasi-linear. Trade…

In a multi-unit market, a seller brings multiple units of a good and tries to sell them to a set of buyers that have monetary endowments. While a Walrasian equilibrium does not always exist in this model, natural relaxations of the concept…

We propose a new methodology to compute equilibria for general equilibrium problems on exchange economies with real financial markets, home-production, and retention. We demonstrate that equilibrium prices can be determined by solving a…

Multi-unit auctions are a paradigmatic model, where a seller brings multiple units of a good, while several buyers bring monetary endowments. It is well known that Walrasian equilibria do not always exist in this model, however compelling…

We study markets of indivisible items in which price-based (Walrasian) equilibria often do not exist due to the discrete non-convex setting. Instead we consider Nash equilibria of the market viewed as a game, where players bid for items,…

Quasiliearity is a ubiquitous and questionable assumption in the standard study of Walrasian equilibria. Quasilinearity implies that a buyer's value for goods purchased in a Walrasian equilibrium is always additive with goods purchased with…

We study combinatorial auctions where each item is sold separately but simultaneously via a second price auction. We ask whether it is possible to efficiently compute in this game a pure Nash equilibrium with social welfare close to the…

The Walras approach to equilibrium focuses on the existence of market prices at which the total demands for goods are matched by the total supplies. Trading activities that might identify such prices by bringing agents together as potential…

We consider dynamic auctions for finding Walrasian equilibria in markets with indivisible items and strong gross substitutes valuation functions. Each price adjustment step in these auction algorithms requires finding an inclusion-wise…

We develop conditions under which individual choices and Walrasian equilibrium prices and allocations can be exactly inferred from finite market data. First, we consider market data that consist of individual demands as prices and incomes…

We study combinatorial auctions with bidders that exhibit endowment effect. In most of the previous work on cognitive biases in algorithmic game theory (e.g., [Kleinberg and Oren, EC'14] and its follow-ups) the focus was on analyzing the…

We study a combinatorial market design problem, where a collection of indivisible objects is to be priced and sold to potential buyers subject to equilibrium constraints.The classic solution concept for such problems is Walrasian…

Walrasian equilibrium is a prominent market equilibrium notion, but rarely exists in markets with indivisible items. We introduce a new market equilibrium notion, called two-price equilibrium (2PE). A 2PE is a relaxation of Walrasian…

We revisit the connection between bargaining and equilibrium in exchange economies, and study its algorithmic implications. We consider bargaining outcomes to be allocations that cannot be blocked (i.e., profitably re-traded) by coalitions…

Walrasian equilibrium prices can be said to coordinate markets: They support a welfare optimal allocation in which each buyer is buying bundle of goods that is individually most preferred. However, this clean story has two caveats. First,…

As is well known, many classes of markets have efficient equilibria, but this depends on agents being non-strategic, i.e. that they declare their true demands when offered goods at particular prices, or in other words, that they are…

We consider the Arrow--Debreu exchange market model under the assumption that the agents' demands satisfy the weak gross substitutes (WGS) property. We present a simple auction algorithm that obtains an approximate market equilibrium for…

We study algorithms for combinatorial market design problems, where a set of heterogeneous and indivisible objects are priced and sold to potential buyers subject to equilibrium constraints. Extending the CWE notion introduced by Feldman et…