相关论文: Fairness and Efficiency in Cake-Cutting with Singl…

In fair division of indivisible items, domain restriction has played a key role in escaping from negative results and providing structural insights into the computational and axiomatic boundaries of fairness. One notable subdomain of…

When allocating a set of indivisible items among agents, the ideal condition of envy-freeness cannot always be achieved. Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX), and envy-freeness with $k$ hidden items (HEF-$k$) are two very compelling…

We study mechanisms for an allocation of goods among agents, where agents have no incentive to lie about their true values (incentive compatible) and for which no agent will seek to exchange outcomes with another (envy-free). Mechanisms…

Schelling's model considers $k$ types of agents each of whom needs to select a vertex on an undirected graph, where every agent prefers to neighbor agents of the same type. We are motivated by a recent line of work that studies solutions…

We study the disproportionate version of the classical cake-cutting problem: how efficiently can we divide a cake, here $[0,1]$, among $n$ agents with different demands $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_n$ summing to $1$? When all the…

We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among a set of agents in a fair and efficient manner. An allocation is said to be fair if it is envy-free up to one good (EF1), which means that each agent prefers its own bundle…

We study the classic setting of envy-free pricing, in which a single seller chooses prices for its many items, with the goal of maximizing revenue once the items are allocated. Despite the large body of work addressing such settings, most…

Behavioural economists have shown that people are often averse to inequality and will make choices to avoid unequal outcomes. In this paper, we consider how to allocate indivisible goods fairly so as to minimize inequality. We consider how…

We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. When randomization is allowed, it is possible to achieve compelling notions of fairness such as envy-freeness, which states that no agent should…

We study fairness in the allocation of discrete goods. Exactly fair (envy-free) allocations are impossible, so we discuss notions of approximate fairness. In particular, we focus on allocations in which the swap of two items serves to…

We study fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents. Prior research focuses on additive agent preferences, which leads to an impossibility when seeking truthfulness, fairness, and efficiency. We show that when agents have binary…

We study the question of dividing a collection of indivisible goods amongst a set of agents. The main objective of research in the area is to achieve one of two goals: fairness or efficiency. On the fairness side, envy-freeness is the…

In the object reallocation problem, achieving Pareto-efficiency is desirable, but may be too demanding for implementation purposes. In contrast, pair-efficiency, which is the minimal efficiency requirement, is more suitable. Despite being a…

We consider the problem of dividing limited resources to individuals arriving over $T$ rounds. Each round has a random number of individuals arrive, and individuals can be characterized by their type (i.e. preferences over the different…

Reallocating resources to get mutually beneficial outcomes is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings. While finding an arbitrary Pareto optimal allocation is generally easy, checking whether a particular allocation is Pareto…

Envy-freeness has become the cornerstone of fair division research. In settings where each individual is allocated a disjoint share of collective resources, it is a compelling fairness axiom which demands that no individual strictly prefer…

We consider the problem of fairly dividing a two dimensional heterogeneous good among multiple players. Applications include division of land as well as ad space in print and electronic media. Classical cake cutting protocols primarily…

Consider $n$ players having preferences over the connected pieces of a cake, identified with the interval $[0,1]$. A classical theorem, found independently by Stromquist and by Woodall in 1980, ensures that, under mild conditions, it is…

We study the recently introduced cake-cutting setting in which the cake is represented by an undirected graph. This generalizes the canonical interval cake and allows for modeling the division of road networks. We show that when the graph…

The problem of finding envy-free allocations of indivisible goods can not always be solved; therefore, it is common to study some relaxations such as envy-free up to one good (EF1). Another property of interest for efficiency of an…