相关论文: Committee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Characterizatio…

Committee selection with diversity or distributional constraints is a ubiquitous problem. However, many of the formal approaches proposed so far have certain drawbacks including (1) computationally intractability in general, and (2)…

In this paper, we propose to decompose the canonical parameter of a multinomial model into a set of participant scores and category scores. External information about the participants or the categories can be used to restrict these scores.…

Proper scoring rules have been a subject of growing interest in recent years, not only as tools for evaluation of probabilistic forecasts but also as methods for estimating probability distributions. In this article, we review the…

We consider approval-based committee voting, i.e. the setting where each voter approves a subset of candidates, and these votes are then used to select a fixed-size set of winners (committee). We propose a natural axiom for this setting,…

We study the complexity of winner determination in single-crossing elections under two classic fully proportional representation rules---Chamberlin--Courant's rule and Monroe's rule. Winner determination for these rules is known to be…

In a party-based election system, the voters are grouped into parties and all voters of a party are assumed to vote according to the party preferences over the candidates. Hence, once the party preferences are declared the outcome of the…

We propose six axioms concerning when one candidate should defeat another in a democratic election involving two or more candidates. Five of the axioms are widely satisfied by known voting procedures. The sixth axiom is a weakening of…

Multi-winner approval voting selects a size-$k$ committee that aggregates voters' approval preferences over a set of alternatives. A central question is coalitional stability: No coalition should be able to pick a committee -- of size at…

By combining a parameterized Hermitian matrix, the realignment matrix of the bipartite density matrix $\rho$ and the vectorization of its reduced density matrices, we present a family of separability criteria, which are stronger than the…

A primary challenge in collective decision-making is that achieving unanimous agreement is difficult, even at the level of criteria. The history of social choice theory illustrates this: numerous normative criteria on voting rules have been…

We introduce a general problem about bribery in voting systems. In the $\mathcal{R}$-Multi-Bribery problem, the goal is to bribe a set of voters at minimum cost such that a desired candidate wins the perturbed election under the voting rule…

A common form of competition is one where judges grade contestants' performances which are then compiled to determine the final ranking of the contestants. Unlike in another common form of competition where two contestants play a…

An important aspect of AI design and ethics is to create systems that reflect aggregate preferences of the society. To this end, the techniques of social choice theory are often utilized. We propose a new social choice function motivated by…

This paper studies a dominance relation among scoring rules with respect to avoiding the selection of the Condorcet loser. In a voting model with three or more alternatives, we say that a scoring rule $f$ Condorcet-loser-dominates…

In a recent article, we introduced and studied a precise class of dynamical systems called solvable systems. These systems present a dynamic ruled by discontinuous ordinary differential equations with solvable right-hand terms and unique…

Scoring rules are used to evaluate the quality of predictions that take the form of probability distributions. A scoring rule is strictly proper if its expected value is uniquely minimized by the true probability distribution. One of the…

Coalitional manipulation in voting is considered to be any scenario in which a group of voters decide to misrepresent their vote in order to secure an outcome they all prefer to the first outcome of the election when they vote honestly. The…

In Approval-Based Committee (ABC) voting, each voter lists the candidates they approve and then a voting rule aggregates the individual approvals into a committee that represents the collective choice of the voters. An extensively studied…

We characterize a value of an observable by a `sum rule' for generally non-commuting observables and a `product rule' when restricted to a maximal commuting subalgebra of observables together with the requirement that the value is unity for…

In this paper, we propose a family of approval voting-schemes for electing committees based on the preferences of voters. In our schemes, we calculate the vector of distances of the possible committees from each of the ballots and, for a…