相关论文: Committee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Characterizatio…

In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumption that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders on the set of alternatives, we study the rules which satisfy suitable symmetries and obey the majority principle.…

Voting is a commonly applied method for the aggregation of the preferences of multiple agents into a joint decision. If preferences are binary, i.e., "yes" and "no", every voting system can be described by a (monotone) Boolean function…

We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to elect multiple winners. These rules are satisfaction approval voting, proportional approval voting, and reweighted approval voting. We first show…

We introduce two models of multiwinner elections with approval preferences and labelled candidates that take the committee's diversity into account. One model aims to find a committee with maximal diversity given a scoring function (e.g. of…

We investigate how robust the results of committee elections are to small changes in the input preference orders, depending on the voting rules used. We find that for typical rules the effect of making a single swap of adjacent candidates…

We study two notions of stability in multiwinner elections that are based on the Condorcet criterion. The first notion was introduced by Gehrlein: A committee is stable if each committee member is preferred to each non-member by a (possibly…

We study two axioms for social choice functions that capture the impact of similar candidates: independence of clones (IoC) and composition consistency (CC). We clarify the relationship between these axioms by observing that CC is strictly…

We define a family of runoff rules that work as follows: voters cast approval ballots over candidates; two finalists are selected; and the winner is decided by majority. With approval-type ballots, there are various ways to select the…

We consider the problem of selecting an $n$-member committee made up of one of $m$ candidates from each of $n$ distinct departments. Using an algebraic approach, we analyze positional voting procedures, including the Borda count, as…

We consider a committee voting on whether to adopt a reform under a quota rule, where members differ in how much they value the reform some supporting it, others opposing it. We examine how members can influence each other's votes through…

Learning compact and interpretable representations is a very natural task, which has not been solved satisfactorily even for simple binary datasets. In this paper, we review various ways of composing experts for binary data and argue that…

In party-approval multiwinner elections the goal is to allocate the seats of a fixed-size committee to parties based on the approval ballots of the voters over the parties. In particular, each voter can approve multiple parties and each…

In many real-world learning tasks, it is expensive to acquire a sufficient number of labeled examples for training. This paper investigates methods for reducing annotation cost by `sample selection'. In this approach, during training the…

Approval-based multiwinner voting rules have recently received much attention in the Computational Social Choice literature. Such rules aggregate approval ballots and determine a winning committee of alternatives. To assess effectiveness,…

Justified representation (JR) is a standard notion of representation in multiwinner approval voting. Not only does a JR committee always exist, but previous work has also shown through experiments that the JR condition can typically be…

Shortlisting of candidates--selecting a group of "best" candidates--is a special case of multiwinner elections. We provide the first in-depth study of the computational complexity of strategic voting for shortlisting based on the perhaps…

We define several different thresholds for election methods by considering different scenarios, corresponding to different proportionality criteria that have been proposed by various authors. In particular, we reformulate the criteria known…

Proportional representation (PR) is one of the central principles in voting. Elegant rules with compelling PR axiomatic properties have the potential to be adopted for several important collective decision making settings. I survey some…

Voting is the aggregation of individual preferences in order to select a winning alternative. Selection of a winner is accomplished via a voting rule, e.g., rank-order voting, majority rule, plurality rule, approval voting. Which voting…

Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules select a winner by successively eliminating candidates with low Borda scores. We show that these rules have a number of desirable computational properties. In particular, with unweighted votes, it is…