相关论文: Reconciling Selfish Routing with Social Good

Self-stabilization is an excellent approach for adding fault tolerance to a distributed multi-agent system. However, two properties of self-stabilization theory, convergence and closure, may not be satisfied if agents are selfish. To…

Path planning is a fundamental and extensively explored problem in robotic control. We present a novel economic perspective on path planning. Specifically, we investigate strategic interactions among path planning agents using a game…

By introducing a simple model based on two-dimensional cellular automata, we reveal the relationship between the routing strategies of individual vehicles and the global behavior of transportation networks. Specifically, we characterize the…

An atomic routing game is a multiplayer game on a directed graph. Each player in the game chooses a path -- a sequence of links that connect its origin node to its destination node -- with the lowest cost, where the cost of each link is a…

Traditional non-atomic selfish routing games present some limitations in properly modeling road traffic. This paper introduces a novel type of non-atomic selfish routing game leveraging concepts from Daganzo's cell transmission model (CTM).…

We study optimal transport-based distributionally robust optimization problems where a fictitious adversary, often envisioned as nature, can choose the distribution of the uncertain problem parameters by reshaping a prescribed reference…

We consider a model of priced resource sharing that combines both queueing behavior and strategic behavior. We study a priority service model where a single server allocates its capacity to agents in proportion to their payment to the…

The Internet is a loose amalgamation of independent service providers acting in their own self-interest. We examine the implications of this economic reality on peering relationships. Specifically, we consider how the incentives of the…

Uncoordinated individuals in human society pursuing their personally optimal strategies do not always achieve the social optimum, the most beneficial state to the society as a whole. Instead, strategies form Nash equilibria which are often…

In congestion games, selfish users behave myopically to crowd to the shortest paths, and the social planner designs mechanisms to regulate such selfish routing through information or payment incentives. However, such mechanism design…

When people pick routes to minimize their travel time, the total experienced delay, or social cost, may be significantly greater than if people followed routes assigned to them by a social planner. This effect is accentuated when human…

We consider a class of multi-robot motion planning problems where each robot is associated with multiple objectives and decoupled task specifications. The problems are formulated as an open-loop non-cooperative differential game. A…

We revisit a classic coordination problem from the perspective of mechanism design: how can we coordinate a social welfare maximizing flow in a network congestion game with selfish players? The classical approach, which computes tolls as a…

We seek to understand the fundamental mathematics governing infrastructure-scale interactions between humans and machines, particularly when the machines' intended purpose is to influence and optimize the behavior of the humans. To that…

In this paper, we propose a multi-player extension of the minimum cost flow problem inspired by a transportation problem that arises in modern transportation industry. We associate one player with each arc of a directed network, each trying…

Planning under social interactions with other agents is an essential problem for autonomous driving. As the actions of the autonomous vehicle in the interactions affect and are also affected by other agents, autonomous vehicles need to…

Highway on-ramps are regarded as typical bottlenecks in transportation networks. In previous work, mainline vehicles' selfish lane choice behavior at on-ramps is studied and regarded as one cause leading to on-ramp inefficiency. When…

Caching networks can reduce the routing costs of accessing contents by caching contents closer to users. However, cache nodes may belong to different entities and behave selfishly to maximize their own benefits, which often lead to…

We propose a new class of game-theoretic models for network formation in which strategies are not directly related to edge choices, but instead correspond more generally to the exertion of social effort. The observed social network is thus…

We study a network congestion game of discrete-time dynamic traffic of atomic agents with a single origin-destination pair. Any agent freely makes a dynamic decision at each vertex (e.g., road crossing) and traffic is regulated with given…