相关论文: Selling Complementary Goods: Dynamics, Efficiency …

Data buyers compete in a game of incomplete information about which a single data seller owns some payoff-relevant information. The seller faces a joint information- and mechanism-design problem: deciding which information to sell, while…

The global dynamics is investigated for a duopoly game where the perfect foresight hypothesis is relaxed and firms are worst-case maximizers. Overlooking the degree of product substitutability as well as the sensitivity of price to…

We consider the problem in which n items arrive to a market sequentially over time, where two agents compete to choose the best possible item. When an agent selects an item, he leaves the market and obtains a payoff given by the value of…

We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with $m$ heterogeneous items and a single buyer whose valuation $v$ for the items may exhibit both substitutes (i.e., for some $S, T$, $v(S \cup T) < v(S) + v(T)$) and complements (i.e., for some $S,…

We provide a new, much simplified and straightforward proof to a result of Pavlov [2011] regarding the revenue maximizing mechanism for selling two goods with uniformly i.i.d. valuations over intervals $[c,c+1]$, to an additive buyer. This…

Globally operating suppliers face the rising challenge of wholesale pricing under scarce data about retail demand, in contrast to better informed, locally operating retailers. At the same time, as local businesses proliferate, markets…

A seller with one unit of a good faces N\geq3 buyers and a single competitor who sells one other identical unit in a second-price auction with a reserve price. Buyers who do not get the seller's good will compete in the competitor's…

The problem of robust dynamic pricing of an abstract commodity, whose inventory is specified at an initial time but never subsequently replenished, originally studied by Perakis and Sood (2006) in discrete time, is considered from the…

Simultaneous item auctions are simple procedures for allocating items to bidders with potentially complex preferences over different item sets. In a simultaneous auction, every bidder submits bids on all items simultaneously. The allocation…

We study one-shot Nash competition between an arbitrary number of identical dealers that compete for the order flow of a client. The client trades either because of proprietary information, exposure to idiosyncratic risk, or a mix of both…

The goal of an auction is to determine commodity prices such that all participants are perfectly happy. Such a solution is called a competitive equilibrium and does not exist in general. For this reason we are interested in solutions which…

We study competition among contests in a general model that allows for an arbitrary and heterogeneous space of contest design, where the goal of the contest designers is to maximize the contestants' sum of efforts. Our main result shows…

Agents attempt to maximize expected profits earned by selling multiple units of a perishable product where their revenue streams are affected by the prices they quote as well as the distribution of other prices quoted in the market by other…

We consider a large population dynamic game in discrete time where players are characterized by time-evolving types. It is a natural assumption that the players' actions cannot anticipate future values of their types. Such games go under…

We consider a Cournot oligopoly model where multiple suppliers (oligopolists) compete by choosing quantities. We compare the social welfare achieved at a Cournot equilibrium to the maximum possible, for the case where the inverse market…

We study a multi-player stochastic differential game, where agents interact through their joint price impact on an asset that they trade to exploit a common trading signal. In this context, we prove that a closed-loop Nash equilibrium…

In this paper, we consider microgrids that interconnect prosumers with distributed energy resources and dynamic loads. Prosumers are connected through the microgrid to trade energy and gain profit while respecting the network constraints.…

We present our results on Uniform Price Auctions, one of the standard sealed-bid multi-unit auction formats, for selling multiple identical units of a single good to multi-demand bidders. Contrary to the truthful and economically efficient…

In this work, we study the interaction of strategic agents in continuous action Cournot games with limited information feedback. Cournot game is the essential market model for many socio-economic systems where agents learn and compete…

We consider a market in which both suppliers and consumers compete for a product via scalar-parameterized supply offers and demand bids. Scalar-parameterized offers/bids are appealing due to their modeling simplicity and desirable…