相关论文: Selling Complementary Goods: Dynamics, Efficiency …

The origin of economic crises is a key problem for economics. We present a model of long-run competitive markets to show that the multiplicity of behaviors in an economic system, over a long time scale, emerge as statistical regularities…

This paper continues the study, initiated by Cole and Fleischer, of the behavior of a tatonnement price update rule in Ongoing Fisher Markets. The prior work showed fast convergence toward an equilibrium when the goods satisfied the weak…

The aim of this paper is threefold. First, we provide a unified framework, by means of non-trivial examples, to compare the results obtained in simultaneous-move and sequential-move versions of bilateral oligopoly with the Cournot model and…

We studied the behavior and variation of utility between the two conflicting players in a closed Nash-equilibrium loop. Our modeling approach also captured the nexus between optimal premium strategizing and firm performance using the…

There has been much recent work on the revenue-raising properties of truthful mechanisms for selling goods to selfish bidders. Typically the revenue of a mechanism is compared against a benchmark (such as, the maximum revenue obtainable by…

A monopolist sells multiple goods to an uninformed buyer. The buyer chooses to learn any one-dimensional linear signal of their values for the goods, anticipating the seller's mechanism. The seller designs an optimal mechanism, anticipating…

We consider a model of a reinsurance market consisting of multiple insurers on the demand side and multiple reinsurers on the supply side, thereby providing a unifying framework and extension of the recent literature on optimality and…

In the mobile communication services, users wish to subscribe to high quality service with a low price level, which leads to competition between mobile network operators (MNOs). The MNOs compete with each other by service prices after…

We study a game between two firms in which each provide a service based on machine learning. The firms are presented with the opportunity to purchase a new corpus of data, which will allow them to potentially improve the quality of their…

We show that, with indivisible goods, the existence of competitive equilibrium fundamentally depends on agents' substitution effects, not their income effects. Our Equilibrium Existence Duality allows us to transport results on the…

Platform giants in China have operated with persistently compressed margins in highly concentrated markets for much of the past decade, despite market shares exceeding 60\% in core segments. Standard theory predicts otherwise: either the…

We quantify the value of the monopoly's bargaining power in terms of competition complexity--that is, the number of additional bidders the monopoly must attract in simple auctions to match the expected revenue of the optimal mechanisms…

Recently Bramoulle and Kranton presented a model for the provision of public goods over a network and showed the existence of a class of Nash equilibria called specialized equilibria wherein some agents exert maximum effort while other…

Frequent violations of fair principles in real-life settings raise the fundamental question of whether such principles can guarantee the existence of a self-enforcing equilibrium in a free economy. We show that elementary principles of…

This work is concerned with the application of game theoretic principles to model competition between demand response aggregators for selling excess energy stored in electrochemical storage devices directly to other aggregators in a power…

We propose a decentralized market model in which agents can negotiate bilateral contracts. This builds on a similar, but centralized, model of trading networks introduced by Hatfield et al. in 2013. Prior work has established that…

We prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium in a production economy with infinitely many commodities and a measure space of agents whose preferences are price dependent. We employ a saturated measure space for the set of agents and…

We study a new model of complementary valuations, which we call "proportional complementarities." In contrast to common models, such as hypergraphic valuations, in our model, we do not assume that the extra value derived from owning a set…

All-pay auctions, a common mechanism for various human and agent interactions, suffers, like many other mechanisms, from the possibility of players' failure to participate in the auction. We model such failures, and fully characterize…

Both classical and quantum version of two models of price competition in duopoly market, the one is realistic and the other is idealized, are investigated. The pure strategy Nash equilibria of the realistic model exists under stricter…