相关论文: How bad is selfish routing in practice?

Routing games are amongst the most well studied domains of game theory. How relevant are these pen-and-paper calculations to understanding the reality of everyday traffic routing? We focus on a semantically rich dataset that captures…

We investigate traffic routing both from the perspective of theory as well as real world data. First, we introduce a new type of games: $\theta$-free flow games. Here, commuters only consider, in their strategy sets, paths whose free-flow…

We consider the interaction among agents engaging in a driving task and we model it as general-sum game. This class of games exhibits a plurality of different equilibria posing the issue of equilibrium selection. While selecting the most…

This paper examines the behavior of the price of anarchy as a function of the traffic inflow in nonatomic congestion games with multiple origin-destination (O/D) pairs. Empirical studies in real-world networks show that the price of anarchy…

Routing games are amongst the most studied classes of games. Their two most well-known properties are that learning dynamics converge to equilibria and that all equilibria are approximately optimal. In this work, we perform a stress test…

Route controlled autonomous vehicles could have a significant impact in reducing congestion in the future. Before applying multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms to route control, we can model the system using a congestion game to…

In this paper, we study a routing and travel-mode choice problem for mobility systems with a multimodal transportation network as a ``mobility game" with coupled action sets. We develop a game-theoretic framework to study the impact on…

The price of anarchy has become a standard measure of the efficiency of equilibria in games. Most of the literature in this area has focused on establishing worst-case bounds for specific classes of games, such as routing games or more…

We study a pricing game in multi-hop relay networks where nodes price their services and route their traffic selfishly and strategically. In this game, each node (1) announces pricing functions which specify the payments it demands from its…

We study selfish routing games where users can choose between regular and priority service for each network edge on their chosen path. Priority users pay an additional fee, but in turn they may travel the edge prior to non-priority users,…

Path selection by selfish agents has traditionally been studied by comparing social optima and equilibria in the Wardrop model, i.e., by investigating the Price of Anarchy in selfish routing. In this work, we refine and extend the…

We examine the routing problem for self-interested vehicles using stochastic decision strategies. By approximating the road latency functions and a non-linear variable transformation, we frame the problem as an aggregative game. We…

Uncoordinated individuals in human society pursuing their personally optimal strategies do not always achieve the social optimum, the most beneficial state to the society as a whole. Instead, strategies form Nash equilibria which are often…

Selfish routing is a central problem in algorithmic game theory, with one of the principal applications being that of routing in road networks. Inspired by the emergence of routing technologies and autonomous driving, we revisit selfish…

We investigate the price of anarchy (PoA) in non-atomic congestion games when the total demand $T$ gets very large. First results in this direction have recently been obtained by \cite{Colini2016On, Colini2017WINE, Colini2017arxiv} for…

Optimizing traffic flow is essential for easing congestion. However, even when globally-optimal, coordinated and individualized routes are provided, users may choose alternative routes which offer lower individual costs. By analyzing the…

Two important metrics for measuring the quality of routing paths are the maximum edge congestion $C$ and maximum path length $D$. Here, we study bicriteria in routing games where each player $i$ selfishly selects a path that simultaneously…

In congestion games, selfish users behave myopically to crowd to the shortest paths, and the social planner designs mechanisms to regulate such selfish routing through information or payment incentives. However, such mechanism design…

Among the many functions a Smart City must support, transportation dominates in terms of resource consumption, strain on the environment, and frustration of its citizens. We study transportation networks under two different routing…

We consider the well-studied game-theoretic version of machine scheduling in which jobs correspond to self-interested users and machines correspond to resources. Here each user chooses a machine trying to minimize her own cost, and such…