相关论文: Pure Nash Equilibrium and Coordination of Players …

There have been great efforts in studying the cascading behavior in social networks such as the innovation diffusion, etc. Game theoretically, in a social network where individuals choose from two strategies: A (the innovation) and B (the…

We consider non-cooperative unsplittable congestion games where players share resources, and each player's strategy is pure and consists of a subset of the resources on which it applies a fixed weight. Such games represent unsplittable…

We consider the problem of optimal charging of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). We treat this problem as a multi-agent game, where vehicles/agents are heterogeneous since they are subject to possibly different constraints. Under the…

We consider the interaction among agents engaging in a driving task and we model it as general-sum game. This class of games exhibits a plurality of different equilibria posing the issue of equilibrium selection. While selecting the most…

A central question in algorithmic game theory is to measure the inefficiency (ratio of costs) of Nash equilibria (NE) with respect to socially optimal solutions. The two established metrics used for this purpose are price of anarchy (POA)…

Sharing unused vehicles is one practical solution for traffic congestion. We propose an advanced vehicle-sharing service that maximizes the sharing of vehicles and improves traffic efficiency by coordinating user trips via an information…

We investigate the price of anarchy (PoA) in non-atomic congestion games when the total demand $T$ gets very large. First results in this direction have recently been obtained by \cite{Colini2016On, Colini2017WINE, Colini2017arxiv} for…

This paper investigates design of noncooperative games from an optimization and control theoretic perspective. Pricing mechanisms are used as a design tool to ensure that the Nash equilibrium of a fairly general class of noncooperative…

The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a well-established game-theoretic concept to shed light on coordination issues arising in open distributed systems. Leaving agents to selfishly optimize comes with the risk of ending up in sub-optimal states…

We introduce natural strategic games on graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in a local setting. We study the existence of equilibria that are resilient to coalitional deviations of unbounded and bounded size (i.e., strong…

In classical job-scheduling games, each job behaves as a selfish player, choosing a machine to minimize its own completion time. To reduce the equilibria inefficiency, coordination mechanisms are employed, allowing each machine to follow…

This paper provides a comprehensive convergence analysis of the PoA of both pure and mixed Nash equilibria in atomic congestion games with unsplittable demands.

Several works have recently suggested to model the problem of coordinating the charging needs of a fleet of electric vehicles as a game, and have proposed distributed algorithms to coordinate the vehicles towards a Nash equilibrium of such…

The price of anarchy (PoA) has been widely used in static games to quantify the loss of efficiency due to noncooperation. Here, we extend this concept to a general differential games framework. In addition, we introduce the price of…

We study the inefficiency of equilibria for various classes of games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i's perceived cost is a convex combination of 1-\alpha_i times his direct…

In the context of networking, research has focused on non-cooperative games, where the selfish agents cannot reach a binding agreement on the way they would share the infrastructure. Many approaches have been proposed for mitigating the…

We study the performance of approximate Nash equilibria for linear congestion games. We consider how much the price of anarchy worsens and how much the price of stability improves as a function of the approximation factor $\epsilon$. We…

In cost sharing games, the existence and efficiency of pure Nash equilibria fundamentally depends on the method that is used to share the resources' costs. We consider a general class of resource allocation problems in which a set of…

We study a game with \emph{strategic} vendors who own multiple items and a single buyer with a submodular valuation function. The goal of the vendors is to maximize their revenue via pricing of the items, given that the buyer will buy the…

We study a general scenario of simultaneous contests that allocate prizes based on equal sharing: each contest awards its prize to all players who satisfy some contest-specific criterion, and the value of this prize to a winner decreases as…