相关论文: The Shapley Value in the Knaster Gain Game

We consider manipulations in the context of coalitional games, where a coalition aims to increase the total payoff of its members. An allocation rule is immune to coalitional manipulation if no coalition can benefit from internal…

The Colonel Blotto game, first introduced by Borel in 1921, is a well-studied game theory classic. Two colonels each have a pool of troops that they divide simultaneously among a set of battlefields. The winner of each battlefield is the…

This paper proposes a new approach to power in Game Theory. Cooperation and conflict are simulated with a mechanism of payoff alteration, called F-game. Using convex combinations of preferences, an F-game can measure players' attitude to…

We introduce a natural variant of weighted voting games, which we refer to as k-Prize Weighted Voting Games. Such games consist of n players with weights, and k prizes, of possibly differing values. The players form coalitions, and the i-th…

In 1964 Shapley devised a family of games for which fictitious play fails to converge to Nash equilibrium. The games are two-player non-zero-sum with 3 pure strategies per player. Shapley assumed that each player played a specific pure…

The paper [Ras15a] introduced distribution-valued games. This game-theoretic model uses probability distributions as payoffs for games in order to express uncertainty about the payoffs. The player's preferences for different payoffs are…

The idea of approximating the Shapley value of an n-person game by Monte Carlo simulation was first suggested by Mann and Shapley (1960) and they also introduced four different heuristical methods to reduce the estimation error. Since 1960,…

In this paper, we study the total displacement statistic of parking functions from the perspective of cooperative game theory. We introduce parking games, which are coalitional cost-sharing games in characteristic function form derived from…

We introduce a new variation of the m-player asymmetric Colonel Blotto game, where the n battles occur as sequential stages of the game, and the winner of each stage needs to spend resources for maintaining his win. The limited resources of…

The Shapley value is one of the most widely used measures of feature importance partly as it measures a feature's average effect on a model's prediction. We introduce joint Shapley values, which directly extend Shapley's axioms and…

In cooperative game theory, associated games allow for providing meaningful characterizations of solution concepts. Moreover, generalized values allow computing an influence or power index of each coalition in a game. In this paper, we view…

We explore the impact of mutual altruism among the players belonging to the same set -- their tribe -- in a partition of all players in arbitrary strategic games upon the quality of equilibria attained. To this end, we introduce the notion…

In this manuscript, we define and study probabilistic values for cooperative games on simplicial complexes. Inspired by the work of Weber "Probabilistic values for games", we establish the new theory step by step, following the classical…

Noncooperative games with uncertain payoffs have been classically studied under the expected-utility theory framework, which relies on the strong assumption that agents behave rationally. However, simple experiments on human decision makers…

Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for multi-coalition games has attracted increasing attention in recent years, but the research mainly focuses on the case without agreement demand within coalitions. This paper considers a…

This paper addresses the benefit allocation in a mixed-energy truck platoon composed of fuel-powered and electric trucks. The interactions among trucks during platoon formation are modeled as a coalitional game with transferable utility. We…

The Shapley value is a game-theoretic notion for wealth distribution that is nowadays extensively used to explain complex data-intensive computation, for instance, in network analysis or machine learning. Recent theoretical works show that…

We introduce the component-wise egalitarian Myerson value for network games. This new value being a convex combination of the Myerson value and the component-wise equal division rule is a player-based allocation rule. In network games under…

Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…

We describe a mechanism to create fair and explainable incentives for software developers to reward contributions to security of a product. We use cooperative game theory to model the actions of the developer team inside a risk management…