相关论文: The Shapley Value in the Knaster Gain Game

We introduce a variable importance measure to quantify the impact of individual input variables to a black box function. Our measure is based on the Shapley value from cooperative game theory. Many measures of variable importance operate by…

In cooperative game theory, the primary focus is the equitable allocation of payoffs or costs among agents. However, in the practical applications of cooperative games, accurately representing games is challenging. In such cases, using an…

This paper aims to reduce the communication and computation costs of the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy for the $N$-coalition noncooperative games proposed in [1]. The objective is achieved in two manners: 1. An interference graph is…

Rosenthal (1973) introduced the class of congestion games and proved that they always possess a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Fotakis et al. (2005) introduce the notion of a greedy strategy tuple, where players sequentially and…

We consider a stochastic version of the well-known Blotto game, called the gladiator game. In this zero-sum allocation game two teams of gladiators engage in a sequence of one-to-one fights in which the probability of winning is a function…

We propose in this paper a coinvestment plan between several stakeholders of different types, namely a physical network owner, operating network nodes, e.g. a network operator or a tower company, and a set of service providers willing to…

In strategic games such as the prisoner's dilemma, allowing players to make binding offers of utility transfers before play has been shown to alter incentives and potentially support cooperative outcomes. These preplay exchange mechanisms…

Despite many distributed resource allocation (DRA) algorithms have been reported in literature, it is still unknown how to allocate the resource optimally over multiple interacting coalitions. One major challenge in solving such a problem…

Myerson first introduced graph-restricted games in order to model the interaction of cooperative players with an underlying communication network. A dedicated solution concept -- the Myerson value -- is perhaps the most important normative…

Coalescence, as a kind of ubiquitous group behavior in the nature and society, means that agents, companies or other substances keep consensus in states and act as a whole. This paper considers coalescence for n rational agents with…

In simple games, larger coalitions typically wield more power, but do all players align their efforts effectively? Consider a voting scenario where a coalition forms, but needs more voters to pass a bill. The cohesion of the new group of…

This paper proposes a coalitional game theory-based approach for reserve optimization to enable DERs participate in tertiary frequency regulation. A two-stage approach is proposed to effectively and precisely allocate spinning reserve…

Social intelligence, the ability to navigate complex interpersonal interactions, presents a fundamental challenge for language agents. Training such agents via reinforcement learning requires solving the credit assignment problem:…

In this paper, we present a model of Partnership Game with respect to the important role of partnership and cooperation in nowdays life. Since such interactions are repeated frequently, we study this model as a Stage Game in the structure…

We consider strategic games that are inspired by Schelling's model of residential segregation. In our model, the agents are partitioned into k types and need to select locations on an undirected graph. Agents can be either stubborn, in…

Maybe an event can't be modeled completely through on game but there is more chance with several games. With emphasis on players' rationality, we present new properties of strategic games, which result in production of other games. Here, a…

This article investigates selfish behavior in games where players are embedded in a social context. A framework is presented which allows us to measure the Windfall of Friendship, i.e., how much players benefit (compared to purely selfish…

The Shapley value is widely used for data valuation in data markets. However, explaining the Shapley value of an owner in a data coalition is an unexplored and challenging task. To tackle this, we formulate the problem of finding the…

This work addresses competitive resource allocation in a sequential setting, where two players allocate resources across objects or locations of shared interest. Departing from the simultaneous Colonel Blotto game, our framework introduces…

We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players' informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player $i$'s prediction…