相关论文: A Game-theoretic Perspective on Communication for …

In this paper, we consider a generalization of cooperative games to the case where a coalition can distribute the earned utility not only among its members but also to other players. In particular, we consider an example where coalitions…

We analyze cooperative Cournot games with boundedly rational firms. Due to cogni- tive constraints, the members of a coalition cannot accurately predict the coalitional structure of the non-members. Thus, they compute their value using…

We propose in this paper a coinvestment plan between several stakeholders of different types, namely a physical network owner, operating network nodes, e.g. a network operator or a tower company, and a set of service providers willing to…

The Shapley value (SV) and Least core (LC) are classic methods in cooperative game theory for cost/profit sharing problems. Both methods have recently been proposed as a principled solution for data valuation tasks, i.e., quantifying the…

In Part I, we studied the communication for omniscience (CO) problem and proposed a parametric (PAR) algorithm to determine the minimum sum-rate at which a set of users indexed by a finite set $V$ attain omniscience. The omniscience in CO…

We study the approximate core for edge cover games, which are cooperative games stemming from edge cover problems. In these games, each player controls a vertex on a network $G = (V, E; w)$, and the cost of a coalition $S\subseteq V$ is…

The core of a cooperative game on a set of players $N$ is one of the most popular concept of solution. When cooperation is restricted (feasible coalitions form a subcollection $\cF$ of $2^N$), the core may become unbounded, which makes it…

Cooperative game theory has diverse applications in contemporary artificial intelligence, including domains like interpretable machine learning, resource allocation, and collaborative decision-making. However, specifying a cooperative game…

We examine cooperative games where the viability of a coalition is determined by whether or not its members have the ability to communicate amongst themselves independently of non-members. This necessary condition for viability was proposed…

A solution concept on a class of transferable utility coalitional games is a multifunction satisfying given criteria of economic rationality. Every solution associates a set of payoff allocations with a coalitional game. This general…

I introduce cooperative product games (CPGs), a cooperative game where every player has a weight, and the value of a coalition is the product of the weights of the players in the coalition. I only look at games where the weights are at…

We show that any cooperative game can be represented by an assignment of costly facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost in an equitable manner. This equitable solution turns out to be the…

We provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first computational study of extensive-form adversarial team games. These games are sequential, zero-sum games in which a team of players, sharing the same utility function, faces an adversary.…

Coalitional games are mathematical models suited to analyze scenarios where players can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. A fundamental problem for coalitional games is to single…

We adopt a continuous-time dynamical system approach to study the evolution of the state of a game driven by the willingness to reduce the total dissatisfaction of the coalitions about their payment. Inspired by the work of Grabisch and…

We introduce a class of cooperative games induced by weighted directed graphs. Specifically, the coalitional value combines an internal interaction term given by the induced subgraph game with an external component based on minimal incoming…

The latest developments in AI focus on agentic systems where artificial and human agents cooperate to realize global goals. An example is collaborative learning, which aims to train a global model based on data from individual agents. A…

The multiple-input single-output interference channel is considered. Each transmitter is assumed to know the channels between itself and all receivers perfectly and the receivers are assumed to treat interference as additive noise. In this…

We extend the coopetition index introduced by Aleandri and Dall'Aglio (2025) for simple games to the broader class of monotone transferable utility (TU) games and to all non-empty coalitions, including singletons. The new formulation allows…

We analyze the core of a cooperative Cournot game. We assume that when contemplating a deviation, the members of a coalition assign positive probability over all possible coalition structures that the non-members can form. We show that when…