相关论文: Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist

We show that computing the revenue-optimal deterministic auction in unit-demand single-buyer Bayesian settings, i.e. the optimal item-pricing, is computationally hard even in single-item settings where the buyer's value distribution is a…

In this paper we consider multidimensional mechanism design problem for selling discrete substitutable items to a group of buyers. Previous work on this problem mostly focus on stochastic description of valuations used by the seller.…

We consider a singular stochastic control problem, which is called the Monotone Follower Stochastic Control Problem and give sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a local-time type optimal control. To establish this…

We quantify the value of the monopoly's bargaining power in terms of competition complexity--that is, the number of additional bidders the monopoly must attract in simple auctions to match the expected revenue of the optimal mechanisms…

The existing literature on optimal auctions focuses on optimizing the expected revenue of the seller, and is appropriate for risk-neutral sellers. In this paper, we identify good mechanisms for risk-averse sellers. As is standard in the…

The intuition that profit is optimized by maximizing marginal revenue is a guiding principle in microeconomics. In the classical auction theory for agents with linear utility and single-dimensional preferences, Bulow and Roberts (1989) show…

In this paper, we study the problem of splitting fairly bundles of items. We show that given $n$ bundles with $m$ kinds of items in them, it is possible to distribute the value of each kind of item fairly among $r$ persons by breaking apart…

We study the problem of selling $n$ items to a single buyer with an additive valuation function. We consider the valuation of the items to be correlated, i.e., desirabilities of the buyer for the items are not drawn independently. Ideally,…

Very few exact solutions are known for the monopolist's $k$-item $n$-buyer maximum revenue problem with additive valuation in which $k, n >1$ and the buyers $i$ have independent private distributions $F^j_i$ on items $j$. In this paper we…

We study optimization problems in which a linear functional is maximized over probability measures that are dominated by a given measure according to an integral stochastic order in an arbitrary dimension. We show that the following four…

This paper develops a model of in-kind redistribution where consumers participate in either a private market or a government-designed program, but not both. We characterize when a social planner, seeking to maximize weighted total surplus,…

We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…

We consider $(M,d)$ a connected and compact manifold and we denote by $X$ the Bernoulli space $M^{\mathbb{N}}$. The shift acting on $X$ is denoted by $\sigma$. We analyze the general XY model, as presented in a recent paper by A. T.…

Two sellers compete to sell identical products to a single buyer. Each seller chooses an arbitrary mechanism, possibly involving lotteries, to sell their product. The utility-maximizing buyer can choose to participate in one or both…

We introduce and study a notion of duality for two classes of optimization problems commonly occurring in probability theory. That is, on an abstract measurable space $(\Omega,\mathcal{F})$, we consider pairs $(E,\mathcal{G})$ where $E$ is…

A seller wants to sell an item to $n$ buyers. Buyer valuations are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution unknown to the seller; the seller only knows that the support is included in $[a, b]$. To be robust, the seller chooses a DSIC mechanism…

We consider the problem of optimal consumption of multiple goods in incomplete semimartingale markets. We formulate the dual problem and identify conditions that allow for existence and uniqueness of the solution and give a characterization…

Standard procurement models assume that the buyer knows the quality of the good at the time of procurement; however, in many settings, the quality is learned only long after the transaction. We study procurement problems in which the…

We investigate existence of dual optimizers in one-dimensional martingale optimal transport problems. While [BNT16] established such existence for weak (quasi-sure) duality, [BHP13] showed existence for the natural stronger pointwise…

We study auctions that are robust at any scale, i.e., they can be applied to sell both expensive and cheap items and achieve the best multiplicative approximations of the optimal revenue in the worst case. We show that the optimal mechanism…