相关论文: Strategy-Proof Facility Location for Concave Cost …

We consider the $k$-Median problem on planar graphs: given an edge-weighted planar graph $G$, a set of clients $C \subseteq V(G)$, a set of facilities $F \subseteq V(G)$, and an integer parameter $k$, the task is to find a set of at most…

We study the classic facility location setting, where we are given $n$ clients and $m$ possible facility locations in some arbitrary metric space, and want to choose a location to build a facility. The exact same setting also arises in…

In this paper, we study the Facility Location Problem with Scarce Resources (FLPSR) under the assumption that agents' type follow a probability distribution. In the FLPSR, the objective is to identify the optimal locations for one or more…

In this paper, we consider the fault-tolerant $k$-median problem and give the \emph{first} constant factor approximation algorithm for it. In the fault-tolerant generalization of classical $k$-median problem, each client $j$ needs to be…

Budget feasible mechanisms, recently initiated by Singer (FOCS 2010), extend algorithmic mechanism design problems to a realistic setting with a budget constraint. We consider the problem of designing truthful budget feasible mechanisms for…

In this paper, we study the following robust optimization problem. Given an independence system and candidate objective functions, we choose an independent set, and then an adversary chooses one objective function, knowing our choice. Our…

We explore the fair distribution of a set of $m$ indivisible chores among $n$ agents, where each agent's costs are evaluated using a monotone cost function. Our focus lies on two fairness criteria: envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) and a…

We extend the Mobile Server Problem, introduced in SPAA'17, to a model where k identical mobile resources, here named servers, answer requests appearing at points in the Euclidean space. In order to reduce communication costs, the positions…

We study facility location problems where agents control multiple locations and when reporting their locations can choose to hide some locations (hiding), report some locations more than once (replication) and lie about their locations…

This paper addresses information-based sensing point selection from a set of possible sensing locations, which determines a set of measurement points maximizing the mutual information between the sensor measurements and the variables of…

In a bipartite max-min LP, we are given a bipartite graph $\myG = (V \cup I \cup K, E)$, where each agent $v \in V$ is adjacent to exactly one constraint $i \in I$ and exactly one objective $k \in K$. Each agent $v$ controls a variable…

We propose a truthful-in-expectation, $(1-1/e)$-approximation mechanism for a strategic variant of the generalized assignment problem (GAP). In GAP, a set of items has to be optimally assigned to a set of bins without exceeding the capacity…

We study truthful mechanisms for approximating the Maximin-Share (MMS) allocation of agents with additive valuations for indivisible goods. Algorithmically, constant factor approximations exist for the problem for any number of agents. When…

We study a multi-leader single-follower congestion game where multiple users (leaders) choose one resource out of a set of resources and, after observing the realized loads, an adversary (single-follower) attacks the resources with maximum…

We study the problem of fair online resource allocation via non-monetary mechanisms, where multiple agents repeatedly share a resource without monetary transfers. Previous work has shown that every agent can guarantee $1/2$ of their ideal…

We consider budget feasible mechanisms for procurement auctions with additive valuation functions. For the divisible case, where agents can be allocated fractionally, there exists an optimal mechanism with approximation guarantee $e/(e-1)$…

We consider the problem of assigning items to platforms where each item has a utility associated with each of the platforms to which it can be assigned. Each platform has a soft constraint over the total number of items it serves, modeled…

We study a general allocation setting where agent valuations are concave additive. In this model, a collection of items must be uniquely distributed among a set of agents, where each agent-item pair has a specified utility. The objective is…

We give nearly-tight upper and lower bounds for the improving multi-armed bandits problem. An instance of this problem has $k$ arms, each of whose reward function is a concave and increasing function of the number of times that arm has been…

We tackle the problem of learning equilibria in simulation-based games. In such games, the players' utility functions cannot be described analytically, as they are given through a black-box simulator that can be queried to obtain noisy…