相关论文: Evolution of interactions and cooperation in the s…

Evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game is studied where initially all players are linked via a regular graph, having four neighbors each. Simultaneously with the strategy evolution, players are allowed to make new…

We study co-evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games where each player can imitate both the strategy and imitation rule from a randomly chosen neighbor with a probability dependent on the payoff difference when the player's income is collected…

We study an evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game where the fitness of the players is determined by both the payoffs from the current interaction and their history. We consider the situation where the selection timescale is slower…

We study a modified prisoner's dilemma game taking place on two-dimensional disordered square lattices. The players are pure strategists and can either cooperate or defect with their immediate neighbors. In the generations each player…

Holding on to one's strategy is natural and common if the later warrants success and satisfaction. This goes against widespread simulation practices of evolutionary games, where players frequently consider changing their strategy even…

Dynamics of evolutionary games strongly depend on underlying networks. We study the coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which players change their local networks as well as strategies (i.e., cooperate or defect). This topic has been…

We investigate an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game among self-driven agents, where collective motion of biological flocks is imitated through averaging directions of neighbors. Depending on the temptation to defect and the velocity at…

Exploiting others is beneficial individually but it could also be detrimental globally. The reverse is also true: a higher cooperation level may change the environment in a way that is beneficial for all competitors. To explore the possible…

We have studied an evolutionary game with spatially arranged players who can choose one of the two strategies (named cooperation and defection for social dilemmas) when playing with their neighbors. In addition to the application of the…

We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game, whereby a coevolutionary rule is introduced that molds the random topology of the interaction network in two ways. First, existing links are deleted whenever a player…

Punishment and partner switching are two well-studied mechanisms that support the evolution of cooperation. Observation of human behaviour suggests that the extent to which punishment is adopted depends on the usage of alternative…

Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the spatial dynamical rules are considered. The players following one of the two pure strategies (cooperation or defection) are distributed on a two-dimensional lattice.…

In spatial games players typically alter their strategy by imitating the most successful or one randomly selected neighbor. Since a single neighbor is taken as reference, the information stemming from other neighbors is neglected, which…

The emergence of mutual cooperation is studied in a spatially extended evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game in which the players are located on the sites of cubic lattices for dimensions d=1, 2, and 3. Each player can choose one of the…

We investigate the spatial distribution and the global frequency of agents who can either cooperate or defect. The agent interaction is described by a deterministic, non-iterated prisoner's dilemma game, further each agent only locally…

We study a spatial two-strategy (cooperation and defection) Prisoner's Dilemma game with two types ($A$ and $B$) of players located on the sites of a square lattice. The evolution of strategy distribution is governed by iterated strategy…

Strategy changes are an essential part of evolutionary games. Here we introduce a simple rule that, depending on the value of a single parameter $w$, influences the selection of players that are considered as potential sources of the new…

The Prisoner's dilemma is the main game theoretical framework in which the onset and maintainance of cooperation in biological populations is studied. In the spatial version of the model, we study the robustness of cooperation in…

We study the evolution of cooperation within the spatial prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice where a fraction of players $\mu$ can spread their strategy more easily than the rest due to a predetermined larger teaching capability. In…

We study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations within popular models of social dilemmas, whereby simple coevolutionary rules are introduced that may enhance players abilities to enforce their strategy on the opponent.…