相关论文: A General Framework for Computing Optimal Correlat…
The complexity of computing equilibrium refinements has been at the forefront of algorithmic game theory research, but it has remained open in the seminal class of potential games; we close this fundamental gap in this paper. We first show…
We provide a unifying, black-box tool for establishing existence of approximate equilibria in weighted congestion games and, at the same time, bounding their Price of Stability. Our framework can handle resources with general…
Computational aspects of solution notions such as Nash equilibrium have been extensively studied, including settings where the ultimate goal is to find an equilibrium that possesses some additional properties. Furthermore, in order to…
This thesis investigates the extent to which the optimal value of a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) can be approximated by some sentence of fixed point logic with counting (FPC). It is known that, assuming $\mathsf{P} \neq…
Quantum game theory lays a foundation for understanding the interaction of people using quantum computers with conflicting interests. Recently Zhang proposed a simple yet rich model to study quantum strategic games, and addressed some…
We show that computing an equilibrium in atomic splittable congestion games with player-specific affine cost functions $l_{e,i}(x) = a_{e,i} x + b_{e,i}$ is $\mathsf{PPAD}$-complete. To prove that the problem is contained in…
This paper studies the connections between mean-field games and the social welfare optimization problems. We consider a mean field game in functional spaces with a large population of agents, each of which seeks to minimize an individual…
In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we explore the concept of equilibrium design, where incentives are designed to obtain a…
It is a well-known fact that correlated equilibria can be computed in polynomial time in a large class of concisely represented games using the celebrated Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm (Papadimitriou and Roughgarden, 2008; Jiang and…
We study the correlated equilibrium polytope $P_G$ of a game $G$ from a combinatorial point of view. We introduce the region of full-dimensionality for this class of polytopes and prove that it is a semialgebraic set for any game. Using a…
We consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria in potential games where each player's strategy set is subject to private uncoupled constraints. This scenario is frequently encountered in real-world applications like road network…
A central challenge in game theory and learning systems such as GANs is understanding which algorithms can efficiently compute equilibria across the heterogeneous landscape of games. Equilibrium computation is typically studied solver by…
We define a class of zero-sum games with combinatorial structure, where the best response problem of one player is to maximize a submodular function. For example, this class includes security games played on networks, as well as the problem…
Combinatorial games lead to several interesting, clean problems in algorithms and complexity theory, many of which remain open. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the area to encourage further research. In particular, we…
Nash equilibria and Pareto optimality are two distinct concepts when dealing with multiple criteria. It is well known that the two concepts do not coincide. However, in this work we show that it is possible to characterize the set of all…
Markov games with coupling constraints model constrained dynamical decision-making involving self-interested agents, where the feasibility of an individual agent's strategy depends on the joint strategies of the others. Such games arise in…
This paper addresses the problem of fair equilibrium selection in graphical games. Our approach is based on the data structure called the {\em best response policy}, which was proposed by Kearns et al. \cite{kls} as a way to represent all…
We consider the complexity of finding a correlated equilibrium of an $n$-player game in a model that allows the algorithm to make queries on players' payoffs at pure strategy profiles. Randomized regret-based dynamics are known to yield an…
We ask when a normal-form game yields a single equilibrium prediction, even if players can coordinate by delegating play to an intermediary such as a platform or a cartel. Delegation outcomes are modeled via coarse correlated equilibria…
This paper is about computing constrained approximate Nash equilibria in polymatrix games, which are succinctly represented many-player games defined by an interaction graph between the players. In a recent breakthrough, Rubinstein showed…