相关论文: Ensuring the boundedness of the core of games with…

Communities in networks are commonly considered as highly cohesive subgraphs which are well separated from the rest of the network. However, cohesion and separation often cannot be maximized at the same time, which is why a compromise is…

We study the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes in hedonic games, which are a class of coalition formation games. We restrict our attention to symmetric additively-separable hedonic games, which are a nontrivial subclass of…

Policy makers focus on stable strategies as the ones adopted by rational players. If there are many such solutions an important question is how to select amongst them. We study this question for the Multicommodity Flow Coalition Game, used…

The assignment game is a classical model for profit sharing and a cornerstone of cooperative game theory. While an imputation in its core guarantees fairness among coalitions, it provides no fairness guarantee at the level of individual…

In optimization or machine learning problems we are given a set of items, usually points in some metric space, and the goal is to minimize or maximize an objective function over some space of candidate solutions. For example, in clustering…

We study bargaining games between suppliers and manufacturers in a network context. Agents wish to enter into contracts in order to generate surplus which then must be divided among the participants. Potential contracts and their surplus…

Federations among sets of Cloud Providers (CPs), whereby a set of CPs agree to mutually use their own resources to run the VMs of other CPs, are considered a promising solution to the problem of reducing the energy cost. In this paper, we…

Cooperation played a significant role in the self-organization and evolution of living organisms. Both network topology and the initial position of cooperators heavily affect the cooperation of social dilemma games. We developed a novel…

The class of algorithmically computable simple games (i) includes the class of games that have finite carriers and (ii) is included in the class of games that have finite winning coalitions. This paper characterizes computable games,…

A game theoretic distributed decision making approach is presented for the problem of control effort allocation in a robotic team based on a novel variant of fictitious play. The proposed learning process allows the robots to accomplish…

We study the extent to which it is possible to approximate the optimal value of a Unique Games instance in Fixed-Point Logic with Counting (FPC). Formally, we prove lower bounds against the accuracy of FPC-interpretations that map Unique…

We study the communication complexity of linear algebraic problems over finite fields in the multi-player message passing model, proving a number of tight lower bounds. Specifically, for a matrix which is distributed among a number of…

We study fair allocation of profit (or cost) for three central problems from combinatorial optimization: Max-Flow, MST and $b$-matching. The essentially unequivocal choice of solution concept for this purpose would be the core, because of…

We consider the problem of data exchange by a group of closely-located wireless nodes. In this problem each node holds a set of packets and needs to obtain all the packets held by other nodes. Each of the nodes can broadcast the packets in…

LP-duality theory has played a central role in the study of the core, right from its early days to the present time. However, despite the extensive nature of this work, basic gaps still remain. We address these gaps using the following…

We consider the capacity problem (or, the single slot scheduling problem) in wireless networks. Our goal is to maximize the number of successful connections in arbitrary wireless networks where a transmission is successful only if the…

The latest developments in AI focus on agentic systems where artificial and human agents cooperate to realize global goals. An example is collaborative learning, which aims to train a global model based on data from individual agents. A…

Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are deemed to be undecidable, unless the information is hierarchically ordered among the players. We identify a class of games for which joint winning…

In this paper we consider a distributed coordination game played by a large number of agents with finite information sets, which characterizes emergence of a single dominant attribute out of a large number of competitors. Formally, $N$…

We consider multi-agent coalitional games with uncertainty in the coalitional values. We provide a novel methodology to study the stability of the grand coalition in the case where each coalition constructs ambiguity sets for the (possibly)…