相关论文: Two-player envy-free multi-cake division

We consider the classic problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous good ("cake") among several agents with different valuations. Classic cake-cutting procedures either allocate each agent a collection of disconnected pieces, or assume that…

We consider the well-studied cake cutting problem in which the goal is to identify a fair allocation based on a minimal number of queries from the agents. The problem has attracted considerable attention within various branches of computer…

We introduce a graphical framework for fair division in cake cutting, where comparisons between agents are limited by an underlying network structure. We generalize the classical fairness notions of envy-freeness and proportionality to this…

We study the existence of fair distributions when we have more guests than pieces to allocate, focusing on envy-free distributions among those who receive a piece. The conditions on the demand from the guests can be weakened from those of…

We consider multi-layered cake cutting in order to fairly allocate numerous divisible resources (layers of cake) among a group of agents under two constraints: contiguity and feasibility. We first introduce a new computational model in a…

Cake-cutting is a fundamental model of dividing a heterogeneous resource, such as land, broadcast time, and advertisement space. In this study, we consider the problem of dividing a discrete cake fairly in which the indivisible goods are…

We propose an online form of the cake cutting problem. This models situations where players arrive and depart during the process of dividing a resource. We show that well known fair division procedures like cut-and-choose and the…

We consider the problem of envy-free cake cutting, which is the distribution of a continuous heterogeneous resource among self interested players such that nobody prefers what somebody else receives to what they get. Existing work has…

In this article we study the problem of fair division. In particular we study a notion introduced by J. Barbanel that generalizes super envy-free fair division. We give a new proof of his result. Our approach allows us to give an explicit…

We study the problem of fair cake-cutting where each agent receives a connected piece of the cake. A division of the cake is deemed fair if it is equitable, which means that all agents derive the same value from their assigned piece. Prior…

We consider the problem of fairly dividing a two dimensional heterogeneous good among multiple players. Applications include division of land as well as ad space in print and electronic media. Classical cake cutting protocols primarily…

In the classical cake cutting problem, a resource must be divided among agents with different utilities so that each agent believes they have received a fair share of the resource relative to the other agents. We introduce a variant of the…

We consider a classic many-to-one matching setting, where participants need to be assigned to teams based on the preferences of both sides. Unlike most of the matching literature, we aim to provide fairness not only to participants, but…

We consider the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous cake between a number of players with different tastes. In this setting, it is known that fairness requirements may result in a suboptimal division from the social welfare…

We study the problem of fairly allocating a divisible resource, also known as cake cutting, with an additional requirement that the shares that different agents receive should be sufficiently separated from one another. This captures, for…

We consider the classic cake-cutting problem of producing envy-free allocations, restricted to the case of four agents. The problem asks for a partition of the cake to four agents, so that every agent finds her piece at least as valuable as…

The fair division literature in economics considers how to divide resources between multiple agents such that the allocation is envy-free: each agent receives their favorite piece. Researchers have developed a variety of fair division…

In classic fair division problems such as cake cutting and rent division, envy-freeness requires that each individual (weakly) prefer his allocation to anyone else's. On a conceptual level, we argue that envy-freeness also provides a…

Cake cutting is one of the most fundamental settings in fair division and mechanism design without money. In this paper, we consider different levels of three fundamental goals in cake cutting: fairness, Pareto optimality, and…

In this paper we study envy-free division problems. The classical approach to such problems, used by David Gale, reduces to considering continuous maps of a simplex to itself and finding sufficient conditions for this map to hit the center…