相关论文: Parimutuel Betting on Permutations

Buy low, sell high is one of the basic rules of thumb used in investment, although it is not considered to be a beneficial strategy. In this paper, we show how the appropriate permutation-based representation (i.e., the epistemic form) of a…

Many auction settings implicitly or explicitly require that bidders are treated equally ex-ante. This may be because discrimination is philosophically or legally impermissible, or because it is practically difficult to implement or…

In many first-price auctions, bidders face considerable strategic uncertainty: They cannot perfectly anticipate the other bidders' bidding behavior. We propose a model in which bidders do not know the entire distribution of opponent bids…

Internet search companies sell advertisement slots based on users' search queries via an auction. While there has been a lot of attention on the auction process and its game-theoretic aspects, our focus is on the advertisers. In particular,…

We study mechanisms for selling a single item when buyers have private costs for participating in the mechanism. An agent's participation cost can also be interpreted as an outside option value that she must forego to participate. This…

We develop a method using parameterized linear equations to define trading mechanisms in market design models. Our method adeptly addresses challenges arising from factors such as complex endowments or coarse priorities, while offering…

We advance a recently flourishing line of work at the intersection of learning theory and computational economics by studying the learnability of two classes of mechanisms prominent in economics, namely menus of lotteries and two-part…

We consider a two-way trading problem, where investors buy and sell a stock whose price moves within a certain range. Naturally they want to maximize their profit. Investors can perform up to $k$ trades, where each trade must involve the…

We study revenue maximization in multi-item multi-bidder auctions under the natural item-independence assumption - a classical problem in Multi-Dimensional Bayesian Mechanism Design. One of the biggest challenges in this area is developing…

We study a mechanism design problem where a seller aims to allocate a good to multiple bidders, each with a private value. The seller supports or favors a specific group, referred to as the minority group. Specifically, the seller requires…

This study explores the design of an efficient rebate policy in auction markets, focusing on a continuous-time setting with competition among market participants. In this model, a stock exchange collects transaction fees from auction…

We construct a sequence of functions that uniformly converge (on compact sets) to the price of Asian option, which is written on a stock whose dynamics follows a jump diffusion, exponentially fast. Each of the element in this sequence…

We analyze the computational complexity of market maker pricing algorithms for combinatorial prediction markets. We focus on Hanson's popular logarithmic market scoring rule market maker (LMSR). Our goal is to implicitly maintain correct…

We study the concept of bribery in the situation where voters are willing to change their votes as we ask them, but where their prices depend on the nature of the change we request. Our model is an extension of the one of Faliszewski et al.…

Diffusion auction design is a new trend in mechanism design for which the main goal is to incentivize existing buyers to invite new buyers, who are their neighbors on a social network, to join an auction even though they are competitors.…

In many areas of industry and society, e.g., energy, healthcare, logistics, agents collect vast amounts of data that they deem proprietary. These data owners extract predictive information of varying quality and relevance from data…

We study independent private values auction environments in which the auctioneer's revenue depends nonlinearly on bidders' interim winning probabilities. Our framework accommodates heterogeneity among bidders and places no ad hoc…

This paper presents the solution to a European option pricing problem by considering a regime-switching jump diffusion model of the underlying financial asset price dynamics. The regimes are assumed to be the results of an observed pure…

In this paper, we introduce a novel, non-recursive, maximal matching algorithm for double auctions, which aims to maximize the amount of commodities to be traded. It differs from the usual equilibrium matching, which clears a market at the…

Algorithms based on combinatorial auctions show significant potential regarding their application for channel assignment problems in multi-connectivity ultra-reliable wireless networks. However the computational effort required by such…