Maximizing Matching in Double-sided Auctions
Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a novel, non-recursive, maximal matching algorithm for double auctions, which aims to maximize the amount of commodities to be traded. It differs from the usual equilibrium matching, which clears a market at the equilibrium price. We compare the two algorithms through experimental analyses, showing that the maximal matching algorithm is favored in scenarios where trading volume is a priority and that it may possibly improve allocative efficiency over equilibrium matching as well. A parameterized algorithm that incorporates both maximal matching and equilibrium matching as special cases is also presented to allow flexible control on how much to trade in a double auction.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1304.3135,
title = {Maximizing Matching in Double-sided Auctions},
author = {Jinzhong Niu and Simon Parsons},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1304.3135},
year = {2013}
}
Comments
16 pages, 4 figures, full-length version of an extended abstract published at the AAMAS 2013 conference