理论经济学
Among two-candidate elections that treat the candidates symmetrically and never result in a tie, which voting rules are fair? A natural requirement is that each voter exerts an equal influence over the outcome, i.e., is equally likely to…
Appropriate decisions depend on information gathered beforehand, yet such information is often obtained through intermediaries with biased preferences. Motivated by settings such as testing and recertification in organ transplantation, we…
When multiple informative equilibria are possible in a general cheap talk game, how much information can a principal guarantee herself? To answer this question, I define the notion of worst-case implementation-implementation via the worst…
Teamwork is vital in many settings, and it is socially beneficial for teams to cooperate in some situations (``good games'') and not in others (``bad games;'' e.g., those that allow for corruption). A team's cooperation in any given game…
We show that, in large population games, decentralized information aggregation generically corrects for individual-level biases. This establishes a new testable aggregate efficiency benchmark where the behavior of boundedly rational agents…
Revised proofs of Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem have been presented in prose form, incorporating novel ideas such as decisive sets and pivotal voters. This study develops another approach to proving the theorem. Using a proof…
State delegations are often chosen through single-member district elections, creating a tension between respecting district majorities and reflecting the statewide electorate. First-past-the-post (FPTP) follows each district's majority but…
Consider a network game with linear best responses and spillovers between players, and let agents endogenously choose their links. A planner considers interventions to subsidize actions and/or links between players, aiming to maximize a…
We study agents playing a pure coordination game on a large social network. Agents are restricted to coordinate locally, without access to a global communication device, and so different regions of the network will converge to different…
Copyright law focuses on whether a new work is "substantially similar" to an existing one, but generative AI can closely imitate style without copying content, a capability now central to ongoing litigation. We argue that existing…
We analyze strategic communication when advice is generated by a reinforcement-learning algorithm rather than by a fully rational sender. Building on the cheap-talk framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982), an advisor adapts its messages…
Assessing an individual's contribution within a team remains a fundamental challenge across many domains, particularly when recognition for collective achievements is limited to only a few members. This issue is especially important in…
A goodness-of-fit index measures the consistency of consumption data with a given model of utility-maximization. We show that for the class of well-behaved (i.e., continuous and increasing) utility functions there is no goodness-of-fit…
A principal delegates choice to an agent whose decision depends on both beliefs and tastes. The principal can steer the delegated decision using two costly instruments: (i) an information policy that determines a Bayes--plausible…
We study identification in models of aggregate choice generated by unobserved behavioral types. An analyst observes only aggregate choice behavior, while the population distribution of types and their type-level choice patterns are latent.…
Belief elicitation is ubiquitous in experiments but can distort behavior in the main tasks. We study when, and how, an experimenter can ask for a series of action-dependent belief statistics after a subject chooses an action, while…
A designer offers vertically-differentiated positions to agents in the absence of transfers. Agents have private outside options and may reject their offers ex-post. The designer has preferences over the quantity of agents who accept each…
We study the instrumental value of conceptual knowledge when making statistical decisions. Such knowledge tells agents how unknown, payoff-relevant states relate. It is distinct from the statistical knowledge gained from observing signals…
We study the implications of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) for the transmission of household preference shocks and for welfare in a New Keynesian framework where the CBDC competes with bank deposits for household resources and…
We study finite normal-form games in which payoffs are subject to random perturbations and players face uncertainty about how these shocks co-move across actions, an ambiguity that naturally arises when only realized (not counterfactual)…