理论经济学

When aggregating Subjective Expected Utility preferences, the Pareto principle leads to an impossibility result unless the individuals have a common belief. This paper examines the source of this impossibility in more detail by considering…

We study independent private values auction environments in which the auctioneer's revenue depends nonlinearly on bidders' interim winning probabilities. Our framework accommodates heterogeneity among bidders and places no ad hoc…

This paper examines how household-targeted government policies influence financial market participation conditional on financial literacy, focusing on potential Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) adoption. Due to the lack of empirical…

This paper analyses the impact of credit expansions arising from decreases in collateral requirements or more expansionary monetary policies on long-term productivity in a model with endogenous growth. Credit expansions associated with…

This paper experimentally evaluates four mechanisms intended to achieve the Uniform outcome in rationing problems (Sprumont, 1991). Our benchmark is the dominant-strategy, direct-revelation mechanism of the Uniform rule. A strategically…

We study efficient risk sharing among risk-averse agents in an economy with a large, finite number of states. Following a random shock to an initial agreement, agents may renegotiate. If they require a minimal utility improvement to accept…

Dynamic decision-making under model uncertainty is central to many economic environments, yet existing bandit and reinforcement learning algorithms rely on the assumption of correct model specification. This paper studies the behavior and…

We study a model of auction design where a seller is selling a set of objects to a set of agents who can be assigned no more than one object. Each agent's preference over (object, payment) pair need not be quasilinear. If the domain…

We demonstrate that a ubiquitous feature of network games, bilateral strategic interactions, is equivalent to having player utilities that are additively separable across opponents. We distinguish two formal notions of bilateral strategic…

We prove that there is no preferential voting method satisfying the Condorcet winner and loser criteria, positive involvement (if a candidate $x$ wins in an initial preference profile, then adding a voter who ranks $x$ uniquely first cannot…

When individuals in a social network learn about an unknown state from private signals and neighbors' actions, the network structure often causes information loss. We consider rational agents and Gaussian signals in the canonical sequential…

India implements the world's most complex affirmative action program through vertical and horizontal reservations. Although applicants can belong to at most one vertical category, they can qualify for multiple horizontal reservation…

We study mechanism design when a designer repeatedly uses a fixed mechanism to interact with strategic agents who learn from observing their allocations. We introduce a static framework, calibrated mechanism design, requiring mechanisms to…

We explore whether ambiguous communication can be beneficial to the sender in a persuasion problem, when the receiver (and possibly the sender) is ambiguity averse. Our analysis highlights the necessity of using a collection of experiments…

We introduce a way to compare actions in decision problems. One action is safer than another if the set of beliefs at which the decision-maker prefers the safer action expands as the decision-maker becomes more risk averse. We provide a…

Minimizing volatility and adjustment costs is of central importance in many economic environments, yet it is often complicated by evolving feasibility constraints. We study a decision maker who repeatedly selects an action from a…

We propose a tractable unified framework to study the evolution and interaction of model-misspecification concerns and complexity aversion in repeated decision problems. This aims to capture environments where decision makers worry that…

We study how a decision-maker (DM) learns from data of unknown quality to form robust, ''general-purpose'' posterior beliefs. We develop a framework for robust learning and belief formation under a minimax-regret criterion, cast as a…

We consider an agent with a rationally inattentive preference over menus of acts, as in de Oliveira et al (2017). We show that two axioms, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Ignorance Equivalence, are necessary and sufficient for…

Motivated by applications such as cloud computing, gig platforms, and blockchain auctions, we study optimal selling mechanisms for dynamic markets with stochastic supply and demand. In our model, buyers with private valuations and…