理论经济学

The theory of Monotone Comparative Statics (MCS) has traditionally required a lattice structure, excluding certain multidimensional environments such as mixed-strategy games where this property fails. We show that this structure is not…

We study the design of fair allocation rules for the abatement of riparian pollution. To do so, we consider the so-called river pollution claims model, recently introduced by Yang et al. (2025) to distribute a budget of emissions permits…

We study how to allocate resources to participants who can strategically misrepresent their deservingness at a cost. A principal assigns item(s) (or money) among multiple agents on the basis of their costly signals. Each agent's signal…

We study price regulation for a monopolist operating in networked markets with demand spillovers. Achieving efficiency requires price reductions proportional to consumers' Katz-Bonacich centralities, which generally cannot be implemented by…

Contest success function (CSF) maps contestants' efforts to their winning probability. This paper provides axiomatizations of CSFs with headstarts. The results extend the classic axiomatization of the Tullock CSF and connect to CSFs that…

This paper explores team formation when workers differ in skills and their desire to out-earn co-workers. I cast this question as a two-dimensional assignment problem with imperfectly transferable utility and show that equilibrium sorting…

We study how market segmentation affects consumers when a monopolist can adjust both prices and product qualities across segments, engaging in second- and third-degree price discrimination simultaneously. We characterize the…

We study allocation mechanisms that utilize costly signaling as a screening tool. A social planner aims to maximize social welfare, defined as the weighted sum of agents' utilities, while implementing a specific allocation rule. Within a…

In an auction each party bids a certain amount and the one which bids the highest is the winner. Interestingly, auctions can also be used as models for other real-world systems. In an all pay auction all parties must pay a forfeit for…

In this paper, we study which data can be induced by a correlated equilibrium given a known finite simultaneous move game. We assume that an analyst has access to the frequency of each agent's actions but does not have access to the…

With recent development of artificial intelligence, it is more common to adopt AI agents in economic activities. This paper explores the economic actions of agents, including human agents and AI agents, in an economic game of trading…

We study repeated task assignment as an instrument for providing effort incentives. Unlike traditional incentive instruments, assignment of a task both determines who produces and provides incentives, and incentives for one worker spill…

We investigate Ekici (2024b)'s multi-center allocation problems, focusing on fairness in this context. We introduce three fairness notions that respect centers' priorities: internal fairness, external fairness, and procedural fairness. The…

Decision makers sometimes cannot observe the consequences of their actions ex-post. This paper axiomatically characterizes a decision model in which the decision maker cares about verifying that a good consequence has been achieved.…

This paper studies a durable goods monopoly with multiple provision levels, free disposability, and zero marginal cost. We establish a Folk-Theorem-type result: as parties become sufficiently patient, equilibrium seller payoffs contains an…

Can a welfare-maximising risk-sharing rule be implemented in a large, decentralised community? We revisit the price-and-choose (P&C) mechanism of Echenique and N\'u\~nez (2025), in which players post price schedules sequentially and the…

We study a social bandit problem featuring production and diffusion of knowledge. While higher connectivity enhances knowledge diffusion, it may reduce knowledge production as agents shy away from experimentation with new ideas and free…

This paper examines the impact of introducing a Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU) agent into a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) pure-exchange economy with no aggregate uncertainty. In the absence of the RDU agent, the classical theory predicts that…

We construct a stochastic dynamical systems theory in which sustainability is a structural boundary property of a fully coupled Earth--Human--Production system. Each subsystem is modelled as a vector-valued process governed by stochastic…

In this paper, we characterize the extreme points of a class of multidimensional monotone functions. This result is then applied to large contests, where it provides a useful representation of optimal allocation rules under a broad class of…