理论经济学
Electric vehicles (EVs) require substantially longer refueling times than gasoline vehicles, which can generate severe congestion at charging stations when demand concentrates. We propose a two-stage allocation framework for EV charging…
We study dynamic mechanism design in a pure-exchange economy with privately observed idiosyncratic income. In the standard infinitely lived hidden-income benchmark of Green (1987) and Thomas-Worrall (1990), constrained-efficient allocations…
This paper points out that rational inattention is a nested regularized optimal transport problem. We use entropic optimal transport to establish the main results in Matejka and McKay (2015) and Caplin, Dean, and Leahy (2019) and extend…
This paper examines bilateral claims problems with lower and upper exclusion thresholds that determine whether an individual is excluded from initial gains or losses. We introduce the exclusion dilation operator, a method that transforms…
We study a spatiotemporal service matching problem in which demand, heterogeneous in location and time sensitivity/preference, is to be assigned to service stations. The planner seeks to maximize social welfare, defined as total service…
The war of attrition with two-sided asymmetric information is a foundational model in political economy, yet it generically admits a continuum of perfect Bayesian equilibria. This paper characterizes the sources of equilibrium multiplicity.…
We propose a model of whataboutism -- a rhetorical strategy that deflects criticism by citing similar misconduct that goes uncriticized on the critic's side -- and study its implications for social norms governing offensive speech. In an…
We study competitive equilibria in exchange economies when a continuum of goods is conflated into a finite set of commodities. The design of conflation choices affects the allocation of scarce resources among agents, by constraining trading…
We provide and axiomatize a representation for preferences over lotteries that generalizes the expected utility model. Since the representation uses different utility functions to evaluate different lotteries, the preferences can be…
We study a public good game with N citizens and a Governor who allocates resources from a common fund. Citizens may voluntarily contribute or be compelled to do so if audited, in which case shirkers face a penalty. The Governor decides how…
Decision makers often opt for the deferral outside option when they find it difficult to make an active choice. Contrary to existing logit models with an outside option where the latter is assigned a fixed value exogenously, this paper…
A vocabulary is a list of words designating subsets from a grand set X. We model a vocabulary as a partition of X and study the aggregation of individual vocabularies into a collective one. We characterize aggregation rules when X is…
The rise of foundation models has driven the emergence of AI supply chains, where upstream foundation model providers offer fine-tuning and inference services to downstream firms developing domain-specific applications. Downstream firms pay…
This paper studies mechanism design environments in which the designer does not know the distribution of agents' private information a priori and instead learns from agents' behavior induced by the mechanism itself. We formalize a notion of…
We study optimization problems in which a linear functional is maximized over probability measures that are dominated by a given measure according to an integral stochastic order in an arbitrary dimension. We show that the following four…
Chiappori et al. (2025) study several indices of assortativeness in matching, including the aggregate likelihood ratio and the odds ratio. We provide a counterexample showing that their axiomatization of the aggregate likelihood ratio is…
Consider an analyst who models a strategic situation using an incomplete information game. The true game may involve correlated, duplicated belief hierarchies, but the analyst lacks knowledge of the correlation structure and can only…
A principal uses payments conditioned on stochastic outcomes of a team project to elicit costly effort from the team members. We develop a multi-agent generalization of a classic first-order approach to contract optimization by leveraging…
We generalize the model of Gallice and Monzon (2019) to incorporate a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their…
This paper proposes a change in perspective on the ``transformation of values'' problem: from ``searching for a single constant solution'' to ``characterizing the allocation space under objective constraints imposed by the physical…