理论经济学

The code that was used in Erdil & Ergin (2008, AER) to compute stable improvement cycles sometimes generated unstable matchings. I identify the minor bug in their code that caused this issue, and I present a corrected implementation. While…

We consider a sender-receiver game in which the receiver's action is binary and the sender's preferences are state-independent. The state is multidimensional. The receiver can select one dimension of the state to check (i.e., observe)…

We introduce an information order on experiments based on weighted garbling, a generalization of the standard notion of garbling. In this order, an experiment is more informative than another if the latter is a weighted garbling of the…

We provide a unifying way to analyze how risk aversion changes bidding in auctions by asking which bids become more attractive as bidders become more risk averse. In first-price auctions, under two payoff conditions--winning is never worse…

We introduce the sampling logit equilibrium (SLE), a stationary concept for population games in which agents evaluate actions using a finite sample of opponents' plays and respond according to a logit choice rule. This framework combines…

We examine how causal beliefs affect an agent's choices and how feedback on those choices leads to updated causal beliefs. Building on the structural-equations framework for modeling causality, we first examine the general problem of…

We develop an analytically tractable model featuring heterogeneous workers and firms, where labor markets clear through a one-to-many sorting mechanism. Firms determine both the number and composition of their employees, shaping (1) the…

We study intergenerational transfers of income. In our stylized model, each generation in an infinite (but countable) stream is endowed with some income. An allocation rule associates with each infinite stream another stream, thus involving…

We study dynamic relationships in which one party extracts current surplus in ways that degrade the future state, while the counterparty cannot exit but adjusts effort in response. Standard stationary Markov equilibria may sustain collapse…

In the context of voting with ranked ballots, an important class of voting rules is the class of margin-based rules (also called pairwise rules). A voting rule is margin-based if whenever two elections generate the same head-to-head margins…

This paper studies optimal consumption and saving decisions under uncertainty about the transition dynamics of the economic environment. We consider a general optimal savings problem in which the exogenous state governing discounting,…

A defining feature of digital goods is that replication and degradation are costless: once a high-quality good is produced, low-quality versions can be created and distributed at no additional cost. This paper studies quality-based…

Delay is the norm in bargaining. I propose a novel source of bargaining delay: absentmindedness. Instead of interpreting absentmindedness as a literal memory friction, I use absentmindedness to represent a broader form of bounded…

Discussions of political disagreement emphasize two patterns: polarization, where beliefs diverge toward opposite extremes on each issue dimension; and issue alignment, where individuals' views across issues become more internally…

We study random utility (RU) rationality with aggregation when the underlying alternatives in each aggregate vary across consumers and are unobserved, as is typical for an outside option. RUM over the underlying alternatives is the natural…

We develop a framework for the optimal pricing and product design of LLMs in which a provider sells menus of token budgets to users who differ in their valuations across a continuum of tasks. Under a homogeneous production technology, we…

We study learning on social media with an equilibrium model of users interacting with shared news stories. Rational users arrive sequentially, observe an original story (i.e., a private signal) and a sample of predecessors' stories in a…

In priority-based matching, serial dictatorship (SD) is simple, strategyproof, and Pareto efficient, but not free of justified envy (i.e. fair). This paper studies how to fairly order agents in SD as a function of their priorities. I show…

We study the monotonicity of information costs: more informative experiments must be more costly. As criteria for informativeness, we consider the standard information orders introduced by Blackwell (1951, 1953) and Lehmann (1988). We…

We study how idiosyncratic firm-level shocks generate aggregate volatility and tail risk when they propagate through a production network under overlapping adjustment: new productivity draws arrive before the economy reaches the static…