Sampling Logit Equilibrium and Endogenous Payoff Distortion
Theoretical Economics
2026-03-11 v1 Dynamical Systems
Abstract
We introduce the sampling logit equilibrium (SLE), a stationary concept for population games in which agents evaluate actions using a finite sample of opponents' plays and respond according to a logit choice rule. This framework combines informational frictions from finite sampling with stochastic choice. When the sample size is large, SLE is well approximated by a logit equilibrium of a virtual game whose payoffs incorporate explicit distortion terms generated by sampling noise. Examples illustrate how finite sampling can systematically shift equilibrium behavior and generate equilibrium selection effects.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2603.09539,
title = {Sampling Logit Equilibrium and Endogenous Payoff Distortion},
author = {Minoru Osawa},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2603.09539},
year = {2026}
}