理论经济学

I consider an environment in which a decision maker faces uncertainty and privately holds information in the form of a signal about the true state of the world. The decision maker purchases additional information from a data broker before…

This paper embeds a signaling friction into the continuous-time heterogeneous agent framework. A continuum of producers operate Cobb-Douglas technologies with regime-specific productivity $A_j \in \{A_L, A_H\}$. Stochastic arrival of…

We present an entirely new physics founded approach to estimating the social cost of carbon (SCC). For this, we developed our Ocean-Heat-Content Physics and Time Macro Economic Model (OPTiMEM) to estimate future heat content (separately…

Despite well-meaning scenarios that propose global CO2 emissions will decline presented in every IPCC report since 1988, the trend of global CO2 increase continues without significant change. Even if any individual nation manages to flatten…

In many auctions, bidders may be reluctant to reveal private information to the auctioneer and other bidders. Among deterministic bilateral communication protocols, reducing what bidders learn requires increasing what the auctioneer learns.…

We study the impact of endogenous attention in a dynamic social media model. Each period, a user observes a random story and decides whether to share it. Users like sharing true and interesting stories, but identifying false stories…

We ask when a normal-form game yields a single equilibrium prediction, even if players can coordinate by delegating play to an intermediary such as a platform or a cartel. Delegation outcomes are modeled via coarse correlated equilibria…

In practice, auction data are often endogenously censored and anonymous, revealing only limited outcome statistics rather than full bid profiles. We study robust auction design when the seller observes only aggregated, anonymous order…

We develop an overlapping generations model where each agent observes a verifiable private signal about the state and, with positive probability, also receives signals disclosed by his predecessor. The agent then takes an action and decides…

We develop a model of social media in which users produce different types of content and choose whom to follow. Even when abstracting from algorithmic bias, linking costs shape networks and polarization. In the welfare-maximizing…

We explore stability and fairness considerations in decentralized networked markets with bilateral contracts, building on the trading networks framework [Hatfield et al., 2013]. In our trading network game, we show that a well-defined…

The long-standing unitary-actor assumption in strategy research -- treating firms as monolithic entities with coherent preferences -- misses that organizations are coalitions of individuals with diverse and often conflicting goals. Although…

The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is infamously revenue non-monotone in combinatorial auctions. I.e., when a buyer increases their value for a bundle of items, the total auction revenue may decrease. Combinatorial auctions exhibit…

This paper studies the implementation of Bayes correlated equilibria in symmetric Bayesian games with nonatomic players, using direct information structures and obedient strategies. The main results demonstrate full implementation in a…

We study the diffusion of a true and a false message (misinformation) when agents are biased and able to verify messages. As a recipient of a false message who verifies it becomes informed of the truth, a higher prevalence of misinformation…

A principal screens an agent with an arbitrary set of allocations $X$. The agent's preferences over allocations are comonotonic. A subset of allocations $X^*\subseteq X$ is a surplus-elasticity frontier if (i) any other allocation has a…

We characterize the identified sets of a wide range of stochastic choice models, including random utility, various models of boundedly-rational behavior, and dynamic discrete choice. In each of these settings, we show two distributions over…

We propose a new principal-agent framework where a principal communicates a roadmap -- a set of plausible outcome models and a prior belief over them -- to guide an agent who is learning the value of innovation. The agent trusts the prior…

In mainstream neoclassical economics, utility maximization is the only engine of individual action, and the other or the social, if it is modeled for decisions deemed fundamental, it is done as a tacit externality parameter affecting an…

This work contributes to a foundational question in economic theory: how do individual-level cognitive biases interact with collective choice mechanisms? We study a setting where voters hold intrinsic preference rankings over a set of…