理论经济学
In a strand of the literature, it is assumed that the common prior has full support; that is, every type of every player is assigned positive probability. Morris (1991,1994) established an epistemological-behavioral duality characterisation…
We study directed social influence when an influencer chooses from a richer menu than a constrained follower (decision maker, the DM). The DM selects from a feasible set, while the influencer displays a distribution over a superset that…
We consider the standard moral hazard problem with limited liability. The first-order approach (FOA) is the main tool for its solution, but existing sufficient conditions for its validity are restrictive. Our main result shows that the FOA…
A principal and an agent can launch a project under unanimous consent. Their individual payoffs from the project depend on an underlying state, and the agent privately knows his own preference. The principal can conduct a test to learn…
Evaluating the financial performance of manufacturing firms requires consideration of both the time value of money and the relative importance of multiple decision criteria. Conventional approaches relying solely on deterministic…
This paper proposes a model of choice via agentic artificial intelligence (AI). A key feature is that the AI may misinterpret a menu before recommending what to choose. A single acyclicity condition guarantees that there is a monotonic…
We study a dynamic matching problem on a two-sided platform with unbalanced patience, in which long-lived supply accumulates over time with a unit waiting cost per period, while short-lived demand departs if not matched promptly. High- or…
We study the design of optimal allocation mechanisms in an environment where agents and goods arrive stochastically. Agents have private types that determine the principal payoff. Either agents or goods can be held in a queue at a flow cost…
Standard decision theory seeks conditions under which a preference relation can be compressed into a single real-valued function. However, when preferences are incomplete or intransitive, a single function fails to capture the agent's…
We study multidimensional cheap talk with simple language and aligned preferences. An expert communicates with a decision-maker using a score that aggregates a multidimensional state into a one-dimensional message. Even though the expert…
We study efficient mechanism design for allocating multiple heterogeneous objects. The aim is to maximize the residual surplus, the total value generated from an allocation minus the costs of screening. We discover a robust trend indicating…
This paper studies multi-object reallocation without monetary transfers, where agents initially own multiple indivisible objects and have strict preferences over bundles (e.g., shift exchange among workers at a firm). Focusing on marginal…
We provide Dutch-book arguments against misspecified Bayesian learning. An agent progressively learns about a state and is offered a bet after every discovery. We say the agent is deterministically Dutch-booked when they would accept all…
I introduce and study a nested search problem modeled as a tree structure that generalizes Weitzman (1979) in two ways: (1) search progresses incrementally, reflecting real-life scenarios where agents gradually acquire information about the…
The global decline in the labor income share has challenged the classical Kaldor facts; however, the macroeconomic aggregation mechanism -- namely, how aggregate factor shares emerge from firm-level heterogeneity -- remains underexplored.…
We study the design of one-to-one matching mechanisms that are strategy-proof for both sides and as stable as possible. Motivated by the impossibility result of Roth (1982), we formulate the mechanism design problem as a linear program that…
The present paper examines the effect of R&D spillovers on regional innovation in Greece over the 2002-2010 period. The approach taken goes beyond a regional knowledge production function and draws possible explanations from a more…
This study develops a novel class of queueing game to explain a common practice in cargo shipping "Sail Fast, Then Wait" (SFTW), and demonstrates that resolving information asymmetry among ships can deconcentrate port arrival times. We…
Achieving incentive compatibility under informational decentralization is impossible within the class of direct and revelation-equivalent mechanisms typically studied in economics and computer science. We show that these impossibility…
Given a set of $n$ individuals with strict preferences over $m$ indivisible objects, the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) mechanism is a method for allocating objects to individuals in a way that is efficient, fair, and…