理论经济学
People learn about opportunities and actions by observing the experiences of their friends. We model how homophily -- the tendency to associate with similar others -- affects both the endogenous quality and diversity of the information…
We propose a solution and a mechanism for two-agent social choice problems with large (infinite) policy spaces. Our solution is an efficient compromise rule between the two agents, built on a common cardinalization of their preferences. Our…
Whether the goal is to analyze voting behavior, locate facilities, or recommend products, the problem of translating between (ordinal) rankings and (numerical) utilities arises naturally in many contexts. This task is commonly approached by…
We apply marginal analysis \`a la Bulow and Roberts (1989) to characterize revenue-maximizing selling mechanisms for a multiproduct monopoly. We derive marginal revenue from price perturbations over arbitrary sets of bundles and show that…
Top trading cycles with fixed tie-breaking (TTC) has been suggested to deal with indifferences in object allocation problems. Unfortunately, under general indifferences, TTC is neither Pareto efficient nor group strategy-proof. Furthermore,…
This paper introduces a novel ranking of statistical experiments, the linear-Blackwell (LB) order, which can equivalently be characterized by (i) the dispersion of the induced posterior and likelihood ratios in the sense of the linear…
We investigate a seller's revenue-maximizing mechanism in a setting where a desirable good is sold together with an undesirable bad (e.g., advertisements) that generates third-party revenue. The buyer's private information is…
A fundamental challenge for modern economics is to understand what happens when actors in an economy are replaced with algorithms. Like rationality has enabled understanding of outcomes of classical economic actors, no-regret can enable the…
Does greater connectivity enhance the value of public information? I study a networked beauty contest game where agents balance adaptation to the fundamental with local coordination. The analysis reveals a stark non-monotonicity: while…
We examine behavioral axioms in decision theory that are satisfied approximately rather than exactly. We demonstrate that in key domains -- decisions under risk, uncertainty, and intertemporal choice -- behavior that \emph{almost} satisfies…
A principal must allocate a set of heterogeneous tasks (or objects) among multiple agents. The principal has preferences over the allocation. Each agent has preferences over which tasks they are assigned, which are their private…
A welfare-maximizing designer allocates two kinds of goods using two wasteful screening instruments: ordeals, which enter agents' utilities additively, and damages, which harm agents in proportion to their values for the goods. If agents…
With a multilateral vertical contracting model of media markets, we examine upstream competition and contractual arrangements in content provision. We analyze the trade of content by the Nash bargaining solution and the downstream…
We revisit the classic paper of Tirole "Asset Bubbles and Overlapping Generations" (1985, Econometrica), which shows that the emergence of asset bubbles solves the capital over-accumulation problem. While Tirole's main insight holds with…
This paper studies optimal mechanisms for collecting and trading data. Consumers benefit from revealing information about their tastes to a service provider because this improves the service. However, the information is also valuable to a…
A long-lived Bayesian agent observes costly signals of a time-varying state. He chooses the signals' precisions sequentially, balancing their costs and marginal informativeness. I compare the optimal myopic and forward-looking precisions…
A speculator can take advantage of a procurement auction by acquiring items for sale before the auction. The accumulated market power can then be exercised in the auction and may lead to a large enough gain to cover the acquisition costs. I…
This paper characterizes DSGE models as fixed-point selection devices for self-referential economic specifications. We formalize this structure as $(S, T, \Pi)$: specification, self-referential operator, and equilibrium selector. The…
Empirical evidence suggests that there is little to no correlation between the rate of inflation and the size of price change. Economists have hitherto taken this to mean that monetary shocks do not generate much deviation in relative…
Machine learning systems embed preferences either in training losses or through post-processing of calibrated predictions. Applying information design methods from Strack and Yang (2024), this paper provides decision problem agnostic…