理论经济学
We study dynamic games with hidden states and absorbing failure, where belief-driven actions can trigger irreversible collapse. In such environments, equilibria that sustain activity generically operate at the boundary of viability. We show…
Empirical evidence shows that wealthy households have substantially higher saving rates and markedly lower marginal propensity to consume (MPC) than other groups. Existing theory cannot account for this pattern unless under restrictive…
We discover that the probability of a shareholder possessing optimal control power evolves in Fibonacci sequence pattern and emerges as the simple harmonic oscillation of 1/2 - 2/3- 1/2 in 12 operations. This novel feature suggests the…
This paper studies how experts with veto power -- gatekeeping experts -- influence agents through communication. Their expertise informs agents' decisions, while veto power provides discipline. Gatekeepers face a dilemma: transparent…
We extend well-known comparative results under expected utility to models of non-expected utility by providing novel conditions on local utility functions. We illustrate how our results parallel, and are distinct from, existing results for…
We study voluntary disclosure with multiple biased senders who may bear costs for disclosing or concealing their private information. Under relevant assumptions, disclosures are strategic substitutes under a disclosure cost but complements…
This chapter develops a unified framework for studying misspecified learning situations in which agents optimize and update beliefs within an incorrect model of their environment. We review the statistical foundations of learning from…
This paper studies the optimal mechanism to motivate effort in a dynamic principal-agent model without transfers. An agent is engaged in a task with uncertain future rewards and can quit at any time. The principal knows the reward and…
We study surplus division in network constrained bilateral matching markets with transferable utility. We introduce a new solution concept, the credible bargaining solution, which refines stability by requiring that, for each matched pair…
The information released to investors in financial markets has various forms. We refer to range information as information about the upper and lower bound which the payoff of a risky asset may reach in the future. This study develops…
The usual definitions of algorithmic fairness focus on population-level statistics, such as demographic parity or equal opportunity. However, in many social or economic contexts, fairness is not perceived globally, but locally, through an…
This paper studies learning in markets with aggregate uncertainty about whether trade is efficient. A long-lived seller offers prices to buyers, who are short-lived and arrive according to a Poisson process. A hidden state determines…
We study how motivated reasoning affects the provision of climate policy in an electoral competition framework. Voters experience anticipatory disutility when future outcomes appear grim and may therefore distort beliefs in response to…
Generative AI systems often display highly uneven performance across tasks that appear ``nearby'': they can be excellent on one prompt and confidently wrong on another with only small changes in wording or context. We call this phenomenon…
This note revisits the analysis of third-degree price discrimination developed by Bergemann et al. (2015), which characterizes the set of consumer-producer surplus pairs that can be achieved through market segmentation. This was proved by…
In normative models a decision-maker is usually assumed to be Bayesian rational, and so to maximize subjective expected utility, within a complete and correctly specified decision model. Following the discussion in Hammond (2007) of…
This paper formalizes a widely used dynamical class--replicator-mutator dynamics and Price-style selection-and-transmission--and makes explicit the modeling choices (scale, atomic unit, interaction topology, transmission kernel) that…
I study an election between two ideologically polarized parties that are both office- and policy-motivated. The parties compete by proposing policies on a single issue. The analysis uncovers a non-monotonic relationship between ideological…
We study the typical structure of games in terms of their connectivity properties. A game is said to be `connected' if it has a pure Nash equilibrium and the property that there is a best-response path from every action profile which is not…
A sender first publicly commits to an experiment and then can privately run additional experiments and selectively disclose their outcomes to a receiver. The sender has private information about the maximal number of additional experiments…