理论经济学
This research analyses the axiomatic link among health expenditures, inflation rate, and gross national income (GNI) per capita concerning the child mortality (CMU5) rate in D-8 nations, employing panel data analysis from 1995 to 2014.…
We model stochastic choices with categorization. The agent preliminarly groups alternatives in homogenous disjoint classes, then randomly chooses one class and randomly picks an item within the selected class. We give a formal definition of…
We revisit Popper's falsifiability criterion. A tester hires a potential expert to produce a theory, offering payments contingent on the observed performance of the theory. In our model, instead of knowing the true data-generating process,…
We study a reputational cheap-talk environment in which a judge, who is privately and imperfectly informed about a state, must choose between two speakers of unknown reliability. Exactly one speaker is an expert who perfectly observes the…
The limited capacity of drones and future one- or two-seat modular vehicles requires multiple units to serve a single large customer (i.e., a customer whose demand exceeds a single vehicle's capacity) simultaneously, whereas small customers…
Classic market design theory is rooted in static models where all participants trade simultaneously. In contrast, modern platform-mediated digital markets are fundamentally dynamic, defined by the asynchronous and stochastic arrival of…
We study social learning from multiple experts whose precision is unknown and who care about reputation. The observer both learns a persistent state and ranks experts. In a binary baseline we characterize per-period equilibria: high types…
We study sequential social learning with endogenous information acquisition when agents have a taste for nonconformity. Each agent observes predecessors' actions, chooses whether to acquire a private signal (and its precision), and then…
This paper introduces a novel framework for analysing equilibrium in structured production systems incorporating a static social division of labour by distinguishing between consumption goods traded in competitive markets and intermediate…
We develop an axiomatic theory for Automated Market Makers (AMMs) in local energy sharing markets and analyze the Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the resulting economy with a Mean-Field Game. In this game, heterogeneous prosumers solve a…
Some well-known solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), such as the Banzhaf value, the Myerson value, and the Aumann-Dreze value, fail to satisfy efficiency. Despite their desirable normative properties, this…
How does targeted advertising influence electoral outcomes? This paper presents a one-dimensional spatial model of voting in which a privately informed challenger persuades voters to support him over the status quo. I show that targeted…
We characterize single-item auction formats that are shill-proof in the sense that a profit-maximizing seller has no incentive to submit shill bids. We distinguish between strong shill-proofness, in which a seller with full knowledge of…
We study social learning in which agents weight neighbors' opinions differently based on their degrees, capturing situations in which agents place more trust in well-connected individuals or, conversely, discount their influence. We derive…
This paper surveys the literature on theories of discrimination, focusing mainly on new contributions. Recent theories expand on the traditional taste-based and statistical discrimination frameworks by considering specific features of…
In this paper, we study axiomatic foundations of Bayesian persuasion, where a principal (i.e., sender) delegates the task of choice making after informing a biased agent (i.e., receiver) about the payoff relevant uncertain state (see, e.g.,…
I develop a revealed preference framework to test whether an aggregate allocation of indivisible objects satisfies Pareto efficiency and individual rationality (PI) without observing individual preferences. Exploiting the type-based…
This paper investigates the decentralized provision of public goods in directed networks. We establish a correspondence between kernels in graph theory and specialized equilibria in which players either contribute a fixed threshold amount…
When are dynamics valuable? In Bayesian environments with public signals and no intertemporal commitment, we study a seller who allocates an economically single-shot resource over time. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions under…
The radio spectrum suitable for commercial wireless services is limited. A portion of the radio spectrum has been reserved for institutions using it for non-commercial purposes such as federal agencies, defense, public safety bodies and…