理论经济学
An economy-wide production network, manifested through monetary input-output coefficients, inherently destabilizes during the general equilibrium propagation of sectoral productivity shocks when substitution elasticities are non-neutral.…
We introduce a framework for comparing the privacy of different mechanisms. A mechanism designer employs a dynamic protocol to elicit agents' private information. Protocols produce a set of contextual privacy violations -- information…
This paper revisits the classic Pandora's box problem, studying a decision-maker (DM) who seeks to minimize her maximal ex-post regret. The DM decides how many options to explore and in what order, before choosing one or taking an outside…
We study mechanism design in environments where agents have private preferences and private information about a common payoff-relevant state. In such settings with multi-dimensional types, standard mechanisms fail to implement efficient…
Prevailing methods of course allocation at undergraduate institutions involve reserving seats to give priority to designated groups of students. We introduce a competitive equilibrium-based mechanism that assigns course seats using student…
We study the problem of aggregating distributions, such as budget proposals, into a collective distribution. An ideal aggregation mechanism would be Pareto efficient, strategyproof, and fair. Most previous work assumes that agents evaluate…
We present a new approach to formulating and solving heterogeneous agent models with aggregate risk. We replace the cross-sectional distribution with low-dimensional prices as state variables and let agents learn equilibrium price dynamics…
We study the implementability of stable matchings in a two-sided market model with one-sided incomplete information. Firms' types are publicly known, whereas workers' types are private information. A mechanism generates a matching and…
The Fourth Industrial Revolution commonly refers to the accelerating technological transformation that has been taking place in the 21st century. Economic growth theories which treat the accumulation of knowledge and its effect on…
This paper introduces Propose or Vote (PoV), a democratic procedure for collective decision-making and elections that does not rely on a central mechanism designer. In the first stage, members of a polity choose whether to become…
In this paper, I develop and characterize two models of random attention that differ from each other with respect to the menu-dependence of the unobserved reference alternatives. In both models, the decision-maker pays attention to subsets…
How should forecasters be incentivized to acquire the most information when learning takes place over time? We address this question in the context of a novel dynamic mechanism design problem in which a designer incentivizes an expert to…
We examine the impact of a change in diversity introduced by a new product on the evolution of an economic system. Modeling Schumpeterian competition as a population game with a unique, attracting, evolutionarily stable state (the…
This study investigates an adaptive pricing scheme aimed at achieving an efficient state in a traffic congestion game characterized by a diverse population of road users. While the planner possesses knowledge of players' preferences, their…
When bidders bid on complex objects, they might be unaware of characteristics effecting their valuations. We assume that each buyer's valuation is a sum of independent random variables, one for each characteristic. When a bidder is unaware…
We study two-player constant-sum Bayesian games with type-independent payoffs. Under a "completeness" statistical condition, any "identifiable'" equilibrium is an ex-post equilibrium. We apply this result to a Downsian election in which…
We study continuous-time persuasion where a sender controls both how informative a signal is over time and when to stop providing information to a receiver. Given an exogenous signal process, the sender can both garble the evolving signal…
This paper studies preference aggregation under ambiguity when agents have incomplete preference relations due to imprecise beliefs. We introduce the "dual" of the Pareto principle, which respects unanimity among individuals, including…
To model the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy, a novel discrete-time, uncertain, infinite time horizon, dynamic game model is developed, where the uncertainties of expectations are modeled by unknown nonlinear but quadratically…
Traditional auction theory posits that bid value exhibits a positive correlation with the probability of securing the auctioned object in ascending auctions. However, under uncertainty and incomplete information, as is characteristic in…