理论经济学

This paper studies the axiomatic bargaining problem and proposes a new class of bargaining solutions, called coarse Nash solutions. These solutions assign to each problem a set of outcomes coarser than that chosen by the classical Nash…

We consider the problem of social choice when transfers between agents are possible. This includes several canonical applications: public-good provision, management of a common resource, settlement of debts, and division of goods. The…

We study a sender-receiver model in which the receiver can commit to a decision rule before the sender determines the information policy. The decision rule can depend on the information structure chosen by the sender and the realized…

Each production establishment is assumed to have, at any given time, a unique combination of capital and labor (a Leontief function), but the aggregate output at that same time must still be modeled with a Cobb-Douglas function (or a CES,…

This paper develops a unified framework in which economic dynamics is treated as evolutionary process analogous to those studied in natural sciences, including physics. Using methods from gauge field theory and plasticity, we show that the…

In problems involving the allocation of a single non-disposable commodity, we study rules defined on a general domain of preferences requiring only that each preference exhibit a unique global maximum. Our focus is on rules that satisfy a…

Cooperative game theory studies how to allocate the joint value generated by a set of players. These games are typically analyzed using the characteristic function form with transferable utility, which represents the value attainable by…

I summarize Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005)'s review on log-concave functions, make several corrections, and augment the discussion with further results that can be useful in obtaining monotone hazard rate. I also provide an application of…

There is a large body of evidence that decision makers frequently depart from Bayesian updating. This paper introduces a model, robust maximum likelihood (RML) updating, where deviations from Bayesian updating are due to multiple…

We explore the resolution of claims problems with history. At a given period of time, a group of agents holds claims over an insufficient endowment, as they did in previous periods. The solution to the present-period problem might be…

Does electoral replacement ensure that officeholders eventually act in voters' interests? We study a reputational model of accountability. Voters observe incumbents' performance and decide whether to replace them. Politicians may be "good"…

The science of pipeline transport is currently governed by a collection of fragmented, discipline-specific theories that are inadequate for addressing the systemic challenges of 21st-century infrastructure. This paper introduces and…

We propose a fresh `meta-game' perspective on the problem of algorithmic collusion in pricing games a la Bertrand. Economists have interpreted the fact that algorithms can learn to price collusively as tacit collusion. We argue instead that…

We study the manipulability of social choice correspondences in situations where individuals have incomplete information about others' preferences. We propose a general concept of manipulability that depends on the extension rule used to…

In the classical Bayesian persuasion model an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. The informed player, the sender, knows the state of nature, while the uninformed one, the receiver, does not. The informed…

Most comparisons of preferences are instances of single-crossing dominance. We examine the lattice structure of single-crossing dominance, proving characterisation, existence and uniqueness results for minimum upper bounds of arbitrary sets…

The theoretical landscape of transportation cost planning is shifting from deterministic linear models to dynamic, data-driven optimization. As supply chains face volatility, static 20th-century cost assumptions prove increasingly…

The International Air Transport Association (IATA) states that the revenue from interline tickets must be shared among the different airlines according to a weighted system. We analyze this problem following an axiomatic approach, and our…

We study Sybil manipulation in BRACE, a competitive equilibrium mechanism for combinatorial exchanges, by treating identity creation as a finite perturbation of the empirical distribution of reported types. Under standard regularity…

If agents engage in motivated reasoning, how does that affect the aggregation of information in society? We study the effects of motivated reasoning in two canonical settings - the Condorcet jury theorem (CJT), and the sequential social…