Non-obvious manipulability in division problems with general preferences
Theoretical Economics
2025-12-18 v1
Abstract
In problems involving the allocation of a single non-disposable commodity, we study rules defined on a general domain of preferences requiring only that each preference exhibit a unique global maximum. Our focus is on rules that satisfy a relaxed form of strategy-proofness, known as non-obvious manipulability. We show that the combination of efficiency and non-obvious manipulability leads to impossibility results, whereas weakening efficiency to unanimity gives rise to a large family of well-behaved non-obviously manipulable rules.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2512.15024,
title = {Non-obvious manipulability in division problems with general preferences},
author = {R. Pablo Arribillaga and Agustin G. Bonifacio},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2512.15024},
year = {2025}
}