Decomposability and Strategy-proofness in Multidimensional Models
Theoretical Economics
2023-11-17 v4
Abstract
We introduce the notion of a multidimensional hybrid preference domain on a (finite) set of alternatives that is a Cartesian product of finitely many components. We demonstrate that in a model of public goods provision, multidimensional hybrid preferences arise naturally through assembling marginal preferences under the condition of semi-separability - a weakening of separability. The main result shows that under a suitable "richness" condition, every strategy-proof rule on this domain can be decomposed into component-wise strategy-proof rules, and more importantly every domain of preferences that reconciles decomposability of rules with strategy-proofness must be a multidimensional hybrid domain.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2303.10889,
title = {Decomposability and Strategy-proofness in Multidimensional Models},
author = {Shurojit Chatterji and Huaxia Zeng},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.10889},
year = {2023}
}