An Axiomatic Decomposition of Strategyproofness for Ordinal Mechanism with Indifferences
Computer Science and Game Theory
2020-07-15 v1
Abstract
We study mechanism which operate on ordinal preference information (i.e., rank ordered lists of alternatives) on the full domain of weak preferences that admits indifferences. We present a novel decomposition of strategyproofness into three axioms: separation monotonic, separation upper invariant, and separation lower invariant. Each axiom is a natural restriction on how mechanisms can react when agents change their opinion about the relative ranking of any two adjacently ranked groups of alternatives. Our result extends a result from (Mennle and Seuken, 2017), a decomposition of strategyproofness for strict preferences, to the full domain that includes weak preferences.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2007.07104,
title = {An Axiomatic Decomposition of Strategyproofness for Ordinal Mechanism with Indifferences},
author = {Timo Mennle and Sven Seuken},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2007.07104},
year = {2020}
}