计算机科学与博弈论

We introduce Team Utility-Constrained Proximal Policy Optimization (TUC-PPO), a new deep reinforcement learning framework. It extends Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) by integrating team welfare objectives specifically for spatial public…

The CAP theorem asserts a trilemma between consistency, availability, and partition tolerance. This paper introduces a rigorous automata-theoretic and economically grounded framework that reframes the CAP trade-off as a constraint…

Censorship resilience is a fundamental assumption underlying the security of blockchain protocols. Additionally, the analysis of blockchain security from an economic and game theoretic perspective has been growing in popularity in recent…

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities as autonomous agents with rapidly expanding applications in various domains. As these agents increasingly engage in socioeconomic interactions, identifying their…

The Shapley value is widely used for data valuation in data markets. However, explaining the Shapley value of an owner in a data coalition is an unexplored and challenging task. To tackle this, we formulate the problem of finding the…

This study investigates cooperation evolution mechanisms in the spatial public goods game. A novel deep reinforcement learning framework, Proximal Policy Optimization with Adversarial Curriculum Transfer (PPO-ACT), is proposed to model…

In the era of Web3, decentralized technologies have emerged as the cornerstone of a new digital paradigm. Backed by a decentralized blockchain architecture, the Web3 space aims to democratize all aspects of the web. From data-sharing to…

A set of objects is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive utility-functions. If we consider the objects as indivisible, many instances of the decision problem: ``Is there a fair division of the objects…

We investigate a traffic assignment problem on a transportation network, considering both the demands of individual drivers and of a large fleet controlled by a central operator (minimizing the fleet's average travel time). We formulate…

We consider correlated equilibria in strategic games in an adversarial environment, where an adversary can compromise the public signal used by the players for choosing their strategies, while players aim at detecting a potential attack as…

Welfare maximization in bilateral trade has been extensively studied in recent years. Previous literature obtained incentive-compatible approximation mechanisms only for the private values case. In this paper, we study welfare maximization…

We construct and study the transition probability matrix of evolutionary games in which the number of players is finite (and relatively small) of such games. We use a simplified version of the population games studied by Sandholm. After…

This paper introduces TEDI (Truthful, Expressive, and Dimension-Insensitive approach), a discretization-free algorithm to learn truthful and utility-maximizing mechanisms. Existing learning-based approaches often rely on discretization of…

A Condorcet winning set addresses the Condorcet paradox by selecting a few candidates--rather than a single winner--such that no unselected alternative is preferred to all of them by a majority of voters. This idea extends to…

We consider fair allocations of indivisible goods to agents with general monotone valuations. We observe that it is useful to introduce a new share-based fairness notion, the {\em residual maximin share} (RMMS). This share is {\em feasible}…

We study zero-sum games in the space of probability distributions over the Euclidean space $\mathbb{R}^d$ with entropy regularization, in the setting when the interaction function between the players is smooth and strongly convex-strongly…

This paper investigates equilibrium computation and the price of anarchy for Bayesian games, which are the fundamental models of games with incomplete information. In normal-form games with complete information, it is known that efficiently…

We consider the problem of a game theorist analyzing a game that uses cryptographic protocols. Ideally, a theorist abstracts protocols as ideal, implementation-independent primitives, letting conclusions in the "ideal world" carry over to…

This paper explores the fair allocation of indivisible items in a multidimensional setting, motivated by the need to address fairness in complex environments where agents assess bundles according to multiple criteria. Such multidimensional…

We consider design of monetary mechanisms for two-sided matching. Mechanisms in the tradition of the deferred acceptance algorithm, even in variants incorporating money, tend to focus on the criterion of stability. Instead, in this work we…