计算机科学与博弈论

Recent policy proposals aim to improve the safety of general-purpose AI, but there is little understanding of the efficacy of different regulatory approaches to AI safety. We present a strategic model that explores the interactions between…

We consider a sequential decision-making setting where, at every round $t$, a market maker posts a bid price $B_t$ and an ask price $A_t$ to an incoming trader (the taker) with a private valuation for one unit of some asset. If the trader's…

In this paper, we investigate how randomness and uncertainty influence learning in games. Specifically, we examine a perturbed variant of the dynamics of "follow-the-regularized-leader" (FTRL), where the players' payoff observations and…

Blockchain transactions consume diverse resources, foremost among them storage, but also computation, communication, and others. Efficiently charging for these resources is crucial for effective system resource allocation and long-term…

In this paper we develop a novel approach to relaxing Arrow's axioms for voting rules, addressing a long-standing critique in social choice theory. Classical axioms (often styled as fairness axioms or fairness criteria) are assessed in a…

We consider the classic cake-cutting problem of producing fair allocations for $n$ agents, in the Robertson-Webb query model. In this model, it is known that: (i) proportional allocations can be computed using $O(n \log n)$ queries, and…

Behavioral diversity, expert imitation, fairness, safety goals and others give rise to preferences in sequential decision making domains that do not decompose additively across time. We introduce the class of convex Markov games that allow…

The computation of equilibrium prices at which the supply of goods matches their demand typically relies on complete information on agents' private attributes, e.g., suppliers' cost functions, which are often unavailable in practice.…

Fairness and privacy are two important concerns in social decision-making processes such as resource allocation. We study privacy in the fair allocation of indivisible resources using the well-established framework of differential privacy.…

We study the problem of delegated choice with inspection cost (DCIC), which is a variant of the delegated choice problem by Kleinberg and Kleinberg (EC'18) as well as an extension of the Pandora's box problem with nonobligatory inspection…

Temporal graphs extend ordinary graphs with discrete time that affects the availability of edges. We consider solving games played on temporal graphs where one player aims to explore the graph, i.e., visit all vertices. The complexity…

We survey two key problems-Multi-Winner Determination and Hedonic Games in Computational Social Choice, with a special focus on their parameterized complexity, and propose some research challenges in the field.

In the field of computational advertising, the integration of ads into the outputs of large language models (LLMs) presents an opportunity to support these services without compromising content integrity. This paper introduces novel auction…

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility…

With the advancement of machine learning, an increasing number of studies are employing automated mechanism design (AMD) methods for optimal auction design. However, all previous AMD architectures designed to generate optimal mechanisms…

In many repeated auction settings, participants care not only about how frequently they win but also how their winnings are distributed over time. This problem arises in various practical domains where avoiding congested demand is crucial,…

While the success of large language models (LLMs) increases demand for machine-generated text, current pay-per-token pricing schemes create a misalignment of incentives known in economics as moral hazard: Text-generating agents have strong…

We study the allocation of shared resources over multiple rounds among competing agents, via the dynamic max-min fair (DMMF) mechanism: the good in each round is allocated to the requesting agent with the least number of allocations…

We quantify the value of the monopoly's bargaining power in terms of competition complexity--that is, the number of additional bidders the monopoly must attract in simple auctions to match the expected revenue of the optimal mechanisms…

Iterative voting is a natural model of repeated strategic decision-making in social choice theory when agents have the opportunity to update their votes prior to finalizing the group decision. Prior work has analyzed the efficacy of…