计算机科学与博弈论

We consider the problem of fair allocation of $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with monotone subadditive valuations. For integer $d \ge 2$, a $d$-multi-allocation is an allocation in which each item is allocated to at most $d$ different…

The problem of computing near-optimal contracts in combinatorial settings has recently attracted significant interest in the computer science community. Previous work has provided a rich body of structural and algorithmic insights into this…

In real-world settings of the Deferred Acceptance stable matching algorithm, such as the American medical residency match (NRMP), school choice programs, and various national university entrance systems, candidates need to decide which…

When allocating indivisible items, there are various ways to use monetary transfers for eliminating envy. Particularly, one can apply a balanced vector of transfer payments, or charge each agent a positive amount, or -- contrarily -- give…

We study approval-based committee voting from a novel perspective. While extant work largely centers around proportional representation of the voters, we shift our focus to the candidates while preserving proportionality. Intuitively,…

Autonomous and learning agents increasingly participate in markets - setting prices, placing bids, ordering inventory. Such agents are not just aiming to optimize in an uncertain environment; they are making decisions in a game-theoretical…

We investigate refinements of the mean-payoff criterion in two-player zero-sum perfect-information stochastic games. A strategy is Blackwell optimal if it is optimal in the discounted game for all discount factors sufficiently close to $1$.…

Real populations are seldom found at the Nash equilibrium strategy. The present work focuses on how population size can be a relevant evolutionary force diverting the population from its expected Nash equilibrium. We introduce the concept…

In first-price auctions for display advertising, exchanges typically communicate the "minimum-bid-to-win" to bidders after the auction as feedback for their bidding algorithms. For a winner, this is the second-highest bid, while for losing…

We contribute the first provable guarantees of global convergence to Nash equilibria (NE) in two-player zero-sum convex Markov games (cMGs) by using independent policy gradient methods. Convex Markov games, recently defined by Gemp et al.…

Fairness is desirable yet challenging to achieve within multi-agent systems, especially when agents differ in latent traits that affect their abilities. This hidden heterogeneity often leads to unequal distributions of wealth, even when…

We consider the cooperative elements that arise in the design of public goods, such as transportation policies and infrastructure. These involve a variety of stakeholders: governments, businesses, advocates, and users. Their eventual…

We study 2-player zero-sum concurrent (i.e., simultaneous move) stochastic B\"uchi games and Transience games on countable graphs. Two players, Max and Min, seek respectively to maximize and minimize the probability of satisfying the game…

We propose two market designs for the optimal day-ahead scheduling of energy exchanges within renewable energy communities. The first one implements a cooperative demand side management scheme inside a community where members objectives are…

We initiate the study of fair distribution of delivery tasks among a set of agents wherein delivery jobs are placed along the vertices of a graph. Our goal is to fairly distribute delivery costs (modeled as a submodular function) among a…

Since its introduction, envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) has become a fundamental solution concept in fair division of indivisible goods. Its existence remains elusive -- even for four agents with additive utility functions, it is unknown…

Lending protocols are one of the main applications of Decentralized Finance (DeFi), enabling crypto-assets loan markets with a total value estimated in the tens of billions of dollars. Unlike traditional lending systems, these protocols…

The Schulze method is a voting rule widely used in practice and enjoys many positive axiomatic properties. While it is computable in polynomial time, its straight-forward implementation does not scale well for large elections. In this…

With the rise of smart contracts, decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) have emerged in public good auctions, allowing "small" bidders to gather together and enlarge their influence in high-valued auctions. However, models and…

We study the allocation of indivisible goods under conflicting constraints, represented by a graph. In this framework, vertices correspond to goods and edges correspond to conflicts between a pair of goods. Each agent is allocated an…