计算机科学与博弈论

The allocation of resources among multiple agents is a fundamental problem in both economics and computer science. In these settings, fairness plays a crucial role in ensuring social acceptability and practical implementation of resource…

This work studies the online contract design problem. The principal's goal is to learn the optimal contract that maximizes her utility through repeated interactions, without prior knowledge of the agent's type (i.e., the agent's cost and…

Multiplayer games on graphs are at the heart of theoretical descriptions of key evolutionary processes that govern vital social and natural systems. However, a comprehensive theoretical framework for solving multiplayer games with an…

Stochastic two-player games model systems with an environment that is both adversarial and stochastic. The adversarial part of the environment is modeled by a player (Player 2) who tries to prevent the system (Player 1) from achieving its…

Resource allocation is fundamental to a variety of societal decision-making settings, ranging from the distribution of charitable donations to assigning limited public housing among interested families. A central challenge in this context…

This paper examines the tactical interaction between drones and tanks in modern warfare through game theory, particularly focusing on Stackelberg equilibrium and backward induction. It describes a high-stakes conflict between two teams: one…

We study the problem of computing optimal correlated equilibria (CEs) in infinite-horizon multi-player stochastic games, where correlation signals are provided over time. In this setting, optimal CEs require history-dependent policies; this…

Bayesian persuasion, an extension of cheap-talk communication, involves an informed sender committing to a signaling scheme to influence a receiver's actions. Compared to cheap talk, this sender's commitment enables the receiver to verify…

Algorithmic trading in modern financial markets is widely acknowledged to exhibit strategic, game-theoretic behaviors whose complexity can be difficult to model. A recent series of papers (Chriss, 2024b,c,a, 2025) has made progress in the…

Feint behaviors refer to a set of deceptive behaviors in a nuanced manner, which enable players to obtain temporal and spatial advantages over opponents in competitive games. Such behaviors are crucial tactics in most competitive…

Feint actions refer to a set of deceptive actions, which enable players to obtain temporal advantages from their opponents. Such actions are regarded as widely-used tactic in most non-deterministic Two-player Games (e.g. boxing and…

We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each…

We study the fair allocation of indivisible resources among agents. Most prior work focuses on fairness and/or efficiency among agents. However, the allocator, as the resource owner, may also be involved in many scenarios (e.g., government…

We focus on a generalization of the classic Minisum approval voting rule, introduced by Barrot and Lang (2016), and referred to as Conditional Minisum (CMS), for multi-issue elections with preferential dependencies. Under this rule, voters…

Significant progress has been recently achieved in developing efficient solutions for simple stochastic games (SSGs), focusing on reachability objectives. While reductions from stochastic parity games (SPGs) to SSGs have been presented in…

Many centralized mechanisms for two-sided matching markets that enjoy strong theoretical properties assume that the planner solicits full information on the preferences of each participating agent. In particular, they expect that…

With the integration of renewable sources in electricity distribution networks, the need to develop intelligent mechanisms for balancing the energy market has arisen. In the absence of such mechanisms, the energy market may face imbalances…

We study a new class of contract design problems where a principal delegates the execution of multiple projects to a set of agents. The principal's expected reward from each project is a combinatorial function of the agents working on it.…

We study the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods for subadditive agents. While constant-\textsf{MMS} bounds have been given for additive and fractionally subadditive agents, the best existential bound for the case of subadditive…

Training large language models (LLMs) requires vast amounts of high-quality data from institutions that face legal, privacy, and strategic constraints. Existing data procurement methods often rely on unverifiable trust or ignore…