计算机科学与博弈论

We study the role of correlation in matching markets, where multiple decision-makers simultaneously face selection problems from the same pool of candidates. We propose a model in which a candidate's priority scores across different…

We study the problem of robust forecast aggregation: combining expert forecasts with provable accuracy guarantees compared to the best possible aggregation of the underlying information. Prior work shows strong impossibility results, e.g.…

We revisit the well-studied problem of designing fair and manipulation-resistant tournament rules. In this problem, we seek a mechanism that (probabilistically) identifies the winner of a tournament after observing round-robin play among…

We study the problem of fairly and truthfully allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with additive preferences. Specifically, we consider truthful mechanisms outputting allocations that satisfy EF$^{+u}_{-v}$, where, in an…

"Egyptian Ratscrew" (ERS) is a modern American card game enjoyed by millions of players worldwide. A game of ERS is won by collecting all of the cards in the deck. Typically this game is won by the player with the fastest reflexes, since…

We study an all-pay contest in which players with low abilities are filtered out before competing for prizes. We consider a setting where the designer admits a certain number of top players. The admitted players update their beliefs based…

We model a procurement scenario in which two \textit{imperfect} bidders act simultaneously on behalf of a single buyer, a configuration common in display advertising and referred to as \textit{side-by-side bidding} but largely unexplored in…

The adoption of reinforcement learning for critical infrastructure defense introduces a vulnerability where sophisticated attackers can strategically exploit the defense algorithm's learning dynamics. While prior work addresses this…

The Fisher market equilibrium for private goods and the Lindahl equilibrium for public goods are classic and fundamental solution concepts for market equilibria. While Fisher market equilibria have been well-studied, the theoretical…

We study the problem of designing multiwinner voting rules that are candidate monotone and proportional. We show that the set of committees satisfying the proportionality axiom of proportionality for solid coalitions is candidate monotone.…

Online platforms connect users with relevant products and services using ads. A key challenge is that a user's search query often leaves their true intent ambiguous. Typically, platforms passively predict relevance based on available…

Zero-sum and non-zero-sum (aka general-sum) games are relevant in a wide range of applications. While general non-zero-sum games are computationally hard, researchers focus on the special class of monotone games for gradient-based…

Roughgarden (2020) initiates the study of Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs), and posits that the on-chain game of a ``good'' TFM should be on-chain simple (OnCS), i.e., incentive compatible for users and the miner. Recent work of Ganesh,…

The deployment of autonomous AI agents in Internet of Things (IoT) energy systems requires decision-making mechanisms that remain robust, efficient, and trustworthy under real-time constraints and imperfect monitoring. While reinforcement…

Correctness is an emergent property of systems where exposing error is cheaper than committing it. In dynamic, low-trust environments, autonomous AI agents benefit from delegating work to sub-agents, yet correctness cannot be assured…

We study a mechanism-design problem in which spiteful agents strive to not only maximize their rewards but also, contingent upon their own payoff levels, seek to lower the opponents' rewards. We characterize all individually rational (IR)…

In this paper, we extend the discussion of the price of anarchy of machine scheduling games to a multi-stage machine setting. The multi-stage setting arises naturally in manufacturing pipelines and distributed computing workflows, when each…

Large Language Models' (LLMs) programming capabilities enable their participation in open-source games: a game-theoretic setting in which players submit computer programs in lieu of actions. These programs offer numerous advantages,…

Condorcet's paradox is a fundamental result in social choice theory which states that there exist elections in which, no matter which candidate wins, a majority of voters prefer a different candidate. In fact, even if we can select any $k$…

A Condorcet winning set is a set of candidates such that no other candidate is preferred by at least half the voters over all members of the set. The Condorcet dimension, which is the minimum cardinality of a Condorcet winning set, is known…