计算机科学与博弈论

We present an algorithm for computing evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) in symmetric perfect-recall extensive-form games of imperfect information. Our main algorithm is for two-player games, and we describe how it can be extended to…

We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of $m$ goods among $n$ agents in the asymptotic setting, where each item's value for each agent is drawn from an underlying joint distribution. Prior works have shown that if this distribution…

Simple Clock Auctions (SCA) are a mechanism commonly used in spectrum auctions to sell lots of frequency bandwidths. We study such an auction with one player having access to perfect information against straightforward bidders. When the…

A partially parallel dynamical noisy binary choice (Ising) game in discrete time of $N$ players on complete graphs with $k$ players having a possibility of changing their strategies at each time moment called $k$-flip Ising game is…

Concavity and its refinements underpin tractability in multiplayer games, where players independently choose actions to maximize their own payoffs which depend on other players' actions. In concave games, where players' strategy sets are…

We study the problem of designing procurement auctions for the strategic uncapacitated facility location problem: a company needs to procure a set of facility locations in order to serve its customers and each facility location is owned by…

In this paper, we examine the robustness of Nash equilibria in continuous games, under both strategic and dynamic uncertainty. Starting with the former, we introduce the notion of a robust equilibrium as those equilibria that remain…

In this paper, we examine the convergence landscape of multi-agent learning under uncertainty. Specifically, we analyze two stochastic models of regularized learning in continuous games -- one in continuous and one in discrete time with the…

Spectrum auctions are the primary mechanism through which governments allocate scarce radio frequencies, with outcomes that shape competition, coverage, and innovation in telecommunications markets. While traditional models of spectrum…

In shift bribery, a briber seeks to promote his preferred candidate by paying voters to raise their ranking. Classical models of shift bribery assume voters act independently, overlooking the role of social influence. However, in reality,…

The goal of multi-winner elections is to choose a fixed-size committee based on voters' preferences. An important concern in this setting is representation: large groups of voters with cohesive preferences should be adequately represented…

With the aim of meeting the worlds net-zero objectives, electricity trading through contractual agreements is becoming increasingly relevant in global and local energy markets. We develop contracts enabling efficient energy trading using…

This paper explores the dynamics of learning in a multi-sector general equilibrium model where firms operate under incomplete information about their production returns to scale. Firms iteratively update their beliefs using maximum…

We study the communication complexity of welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with bidders from either a standard valuation class (which require exponential communication to explicitly state, such as subadditive or XOS), or…

We study a strategic experimentation game with exponential bandits, in which experiment outcomes are private. The equilibrium amount of experimentation is always higher than in the benchmark case where experiment outcomes are publicly…

Stories are records of our experiences and their analysis reveals insights into the nature of being human. Successful analyses are often interdisciplinary, leveraging mathematical tools to extract structure from stories and insights from…

We study contests where the designer's objective is an extension of the widely studied objective of maximizing the total output: The designer gets zero marginal utility from a player's output if the output of the player is very low or very…

Combinatorial Game Theory(CGT)is a branch of Game Theory that has developed largely independently of Economic Game Theory (EGT), and is concerned with deep mathematical properties of two-player zero-sum games recursively defined over…

The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a standard metric for quantifying inefficiency in socio-technical systems, widely used to guide policies like traffic tolling. Conventional PoA analysis relies on exact numerical costs. However, in many…

Leader-follower general-sum stochastic games (LF-GSSGs) model sequential decision-making under asymmetric commitment, where a leader commits to a policy and a follower best responds, yielding a strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) with…