计算机科学与博弈论

We consider a setting in which a group of agents share resources that must be allocated among them in each discrete time period. Agents have time-varying demands and derive constant marginal utility from each unit of resource received up to…

The map of elections framework is a methodology for visualizing and analyzing election datasets. So far, the framework was restricted to elections that have equal numbers of candidates, equal numbers of voters, and where all the (ordinal)…

As artificial intelligence increasingly automates decision-making in competitive markets, understanding the resulting dynamics and ensuring fair market mechanisms is essential. We investigate the multi-faceted decision-making of large…

Subgame solving is a technique for scaling algorithms to large games by locally refining a precomputed blueprint strategy during gameplay. While straightforward in perfect-information games where search starts from the current state,…

Suppose we need a deep collective analysis of an open scientific problem: there is a complex scientific hypothesis and a large online group of mutually unrelated experts with relevant private information of a diverse and unpredictable…

The widespread adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) through Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) induces a critical vulnerability: the potential for dishonest manipulation by service providers. This manipulation can manifest in…

We introduce capital games, which generalize the definition of standard games to incorporate dynamics. In capital games, payoffs are in units of capital which are not assumed to be units of utility. The dynamics allow us to infer player…

A strategy profile in a multi-player game is a Nash equilibrium if no player can unilaterally deviate to achieve a strictly better payoff. A profile is an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium if no player can gain more than $\epsilon$ by…

The Value Problem for weighted timed games (WTGs) consists in determining, given a two-player weighted timed game with a reachability objective and a rational threshold, whether or not the value of the game exceeds the threshold. This…

We study a portioning setting in which a public resource such as time or money is to be divided among a given set of candidates, and each agent proposes a division of the resource. We consider two families of aggregation rules for this…

We study multi-agent contracts, in which a principal delegates a task to multiple agents and incentivizes them to exert effort. Prior research has mostly focused on maximizing the principal's utility, often resulting in highly disparate…

How much influence can a coordinated coalition exert in a multiwinner Top-$k$ election under a positional scoring rule? We study the maximum displacement problem: with coalition size $m$, how many of the current top-$k$ winners can be…

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. Ex-ante fairness (proportionality) can trivially be obtained by giving all goods to a random agent. Yet, such an allocation is…

We study the complexity of candidate control in participatory budgeting elections. The goal of constructive candidate control is to ensure that a given candidate wins by either adding or deleting candidates from the election (in the…

We study revenue maximization when a seller offers $k$ identical units to ex ante heterogeneous, unit-demand buyers. While anonymous pricing can be $\Theta(\log k)$ worse than optimal in general multi-unit environments, we show that this…

The study of \textit{regret minimization in fixed-price bilateral trade} has received considerable attention in recent research. Previous works [CCC+24a, CCC+24b, AFF24, BCCF24, CJLZ25, LCM25a, GDFS25] have acquired a thorough understanding…

Game-theoretic models and solution concepts provide rigorous tools for predicting collective behavior in multi-agent systems. In practice, however, different agents may rely on different game-theoretic models to design their strategies. As…

House allocation is an extremely well-studied problem in the field of fair allocation, where the goal is to assign $n$ houses to $n$ agents while satisfying certain fairness criterion, e.g., envy-freeness. To model social interactions, the…

Real-world pricing mechanisms are typically optimized using training data, a setting corresponding to the \textit{pricing query complexity} problem in Mechanism Design. The previous work [LSTW23] studies the \textit{single-distribution}…

This paper studies fair division of divisible and indivisible items among agents whose cardinal preferences are not necessarily monotone. We establish the existence of fair divisions and develop approximation algorithms to compute them. We…