计算机科学与博弈论

In the context of large population symmetric games, approximate Nash equilibria are introduced through equilibrium solutions of the corresponding mean field game in the sense that the individual gain from optimal unilateral deviation under…

The equivalence between von Neumann's Minimax Theorem for zero-sum games and the LP Duality Theorem connects cornerstone problems of the two fields of game theory and optimization, respectively, and has been the subject of intense scrutiny…

Problem definition: In many matching markets, some agents are fully flexible, while others only accept a subset of jobs. For example, ridesharing drivers can specify on the platform the destinations they are willing to accept. Conventional…

In an ordinal election, two candidates are said to be perfect clones if every voter ranks them adjacently. The independence of clones axiom then states that removing one of the two clones should not change the election outcome. This axiom…

Modern content platforms offer paid promotion to mitigate cold start by allocating exposure via auctions. Our empirical analysis reveals a counterintuitive flaw in this paradigm: while promotion rescues low-to-medium quality content, it can…

This paper introduces and analyzes \emph{defensive rebalancing}, a novel mechanism for protecting constant-function market makers (CFMMs) from value leakage due to arbitrage. A \emph{rebalancing} transfers assets directly from one CFMM's…

Optimization under uncertainty is a fundamental problem in learning and decision-making, particularly in multi-agent systems. Previously, Feldman, Kalai, and Tennenholtz [2010] demonstrated the ability to efficiently compete in repeated…

We study auction design when a seller relies on machine-learning predictions of bidders' valuations that may be unreliable. Motivated by modern ML systems that are often accurate but occasionally fail in a way that is essentially…

While multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has produced numerous algorithms that converge to Nash or related equilibria, such equilibria are often non-unique and can exhibit widely varying efficiency. This raises a fundamental…

We introduce and study isomorphic distances between ordinal elections (with the same numbers of candidates and voters). The main feature of these distances is that they are invariant to renaming the candidates and voters, and two elections…

We investigate how robust approval-based multiwinner voting rules are to small perturbations in the votes. In particular, we consider the extent to which a committee can change after we add/remove/swap one approval, and we consider the…

We introduce a single-winner perspective on voting on matchings, in which voters have preferences over possible matchings in a graph, and the goal is to select a single collectively desirable matching. Unlike in classical matching problems,…

Sustainable monetization of Large Language Models (LLMs) remains a critical open challenge. Traditional search advertising, which relies on static keywords, fails to capture the fleeting, context-dependent user intents--the specific…

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) implicitly aggregates heterogeneous human preferences into a single utility function, even though the underlying utilities of the participants are in practice diverse. Hence, RLHF can be…

Fog of War chess is a popular variant of classical chess, in which both players have only partial information about the position of the opponent's pieces. This study provides the first theoretical analysis of endgames in Fog of War chess.…

Participatory Budgeting (PB) is commonly studied from an axiomatic perspective, where the aim is to design procedurally fair and economically efficient rules for voters with full information regarding their preferences. In contrast, we take…

We study the independent approval model (IAM) for approval elections, where each candidate has its own approval probability and is approved independently of the other ones. This model generalizes, e.g., the impartial culture, the Hamming…

In the fundamental Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems, there are inherent trade-offs between the size and stability of solutions. While in the former problem, a stable matching always exists and can be found efficiently using the…

We form a "map of tournaments" by adapting the map framework from the world of elections. By a tournament we mean a complete directed graph where the nodes are the players and an edge points from a winner of a game to the loser (with no…

Decentralized decision making in multi--product firms can lead to efficiency losses when autonomous decision makers fail to internalize cross--product demand interactions. This paper quantifies the magnitude of such losses by analyzing the…